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ARTICLE
UNILATERAL STEPS TO END
HIGH SEAS FISHING
by: Katrina M. Wyman*
ABSTRACT
In discussions about the overexploitation of the vast oceans that lie beyond
national jurisdiction, one bold proposal is to close fishing entirely on the high
seas. Existing research suggests that converting the high seas into a giant re-
serve for fish might increase overall global fish catches by boosting fish
catches within the adjoining areas of the oceans under national control. This
conversion also might help to protect marine biological diversity, which is par-
ticularly important in an era of climate change. This Essay identifies the po-
tential that the United States—a significant importer of high seas fish—might
unilaterally take steps to end fishing on the high seas, using its market lever-
age. This Essay then analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of taking uni-
lateral steps to end fishing on the high seas and the conditions under which the
United States might take such steps.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2014, a fisheries economist and a biologist published a thought
experiment and a bioeconomic model about what would happen if fish
were no longer caught on the high seas.1 Roughly 40% of the oceans
are within nationally-controlled Exclusive Economic Zones
(“EEZs”), and most wild fish are caught within these EEZs. The high
seas—defined as the waters beyond these EEZs—cover approxi-
mately 60% of the surface of the oceans and are the site of perhaps
12% of world fish catches.2 However, that 12% understates the signifi-
1. Crow White & Christopher Costello, Close the High Seas to Fishing?, PLOS
BIOLOGY, Mar. 2014, at 1, 1, https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article/file?id=10.13
71/journal.pbio.1001826&type=printable [https://perma.cc/AJ2N-P3EX]. See also U.
Rashid Sumaila et al., Fisheries Subsidies and Potential Loss in SIDS Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zones: Food Security Implications, 18 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 427 (2013), https://
www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/E6C31D18CE662
3F2966E9FE1F66432A0/S1355770X13000156a.pdf/fisheries_subsidies_and_potential_
catch_loss_in_sids_exclusive_economic_zones_food_security_implications.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M8S6-VVR5]; U. Rashid Sumaila et al., Winners and Losers in a World
Where the High Seas Is Closed to Fishing, 5 SCI. REPS., Feb. 12, 2015, https://www
.nature.com/articles/srep08481 [https://perma.cc/5GUN-WNU8] [hereinafter Sumaila
et al., Winners]; Louise S.L. Teh et al., Impact of High Seas Closure on Food Security
in Low Income Fish Dependent Countries, PLOS ONE, Dec. 29, 2016, at 1, http://
journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0168529&type=print
able [https://perma.cc/Q9FL-95F4].
2. A.D. ROGERS ET AL., THE HIGH SEAS AND US: UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE
OF HIGH-SEAS ECOSYSTEMS 4, 13 (2014), http://www.oceanunite.org/wp-content/up
loads/2016/03/High-Seas-and-Us.FINAL_.FINAL_.high_.spreads.pdf [https://perma
.cc/X67P-CS6A] (“We found that a total annual average of about 10 million [tons] of
fish from highly migratory and straddling stocks were caught in the high seas, consti-
tuting just over 12% of the global annual average marine fisheries catch of 80 million
[tons]. The landed value of this catch is estimated at about US$16 billion annually,
which makes up about 15% of total global marine landed value of about US$109
billion. Tuna species account for the largest share of value and the second largest
share of total catch.” (internal citations omitted)). See also Bloomberg Editors, Opin-
ion: Ban Fishing on the High Seas, NAT’L FISHERMAN (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.na
tionalfisherman.com/viewpoints/national-international/opinion-ban-fishing-on-the-
high-seas/ [https://perma.cc/92WB-JLA4]. Enric Sala et al., The Economics of Fishing
the High Seas, SCI. ADVANCES, June 6, 2018, at 1, 1, http://advances.sciencemag.org/
content/advances/4/6/eaat2504.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/799E-8J4J] (“6% of global
catch and 8% of global fishing revenue in 2014” came from the high seas); Laurenne
Schiller et al., High Seas Fisheries Play a Negligible Role in Addressing Global Food
Security, 4 SCI. ADVANCES, Aug. 8, 2018, at 1, 2, http://advances.sciencemag.org/con
tent/advances/4/8/eaat8351.full.pdf  [https://perma.cc/9B29-GRNZ] (in 2009–2014,
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cance of high seas fish populations. The health of high seas fisheries
also affects fisheries within EEZs because very few fish exist only in
the high seas; many fish swim between EEZs and the high seas.3
The idea of establishing a reserve for fish on the high seas arises
from the frustration of many environmentalists with the existing inter-
national regime for managing high seas fisheries.4 This regime princi-
pally relies on just under twenty regional fisheries management
organizations (“RFMOs”) to regulate fish catches and relies on flag
and port states to enforce the RFMO regulations.5 Every ship must be
registered by a state—its flag state—to enjoy the right to navigation;
the port state controls the port where a vessel lands.6 In general, high
seas fisheries under RFMO management are in poor shape. Roughly
two-thirds of the fish stocks managed by RFMOs are “depleted or
overexploited.”7
The proponents of ending fishing on the high seas point to a num-
ber of advantages. Models predict that ending this fishing will increase
fish populations on the high seas and within the adjoining EEZs, and
therefore, global fish catches will rise because of higher catch levels
within EEZs.8 The end of high seas fishing also may protect marine
biological diversity—an important consideration in an era of ocean
acidification and climate change.9 In addition, ending high seas fishing
might have a positive distributional impact. The vessels of ten coun-
tries now catch over 60% of fish harvested on the high seas.10 Model-
“4.2% of the annual marine catch . . . and 2.4% of all seafood production, including
freshwater species and aquaculture . . . .”).
3. GLOBAL OCEAN COMM’N, FROM DECLINE TO RECOVERY—A RESCUE PACK-
AGE FOR THE GLOBAL OCEAN 75 (2014) (“Only 3% of the main high seas fish species
are caught exclusively in the high seas.”); ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 13 (42%
“of the global commercially important fish species we analy[z]ed are caught in both
the high and coastal seas. Less than 1% are caught exclusively on the high seas. The
highly migratory and ‘straddling’ stocks that occur in both the high seas and in EEZs
account for 67% of the total global catch and 72% of the total landed value associated
with global commercial fisheries.”).
4. See, e.g., Sarika Cullis-Suzuki & Daniel Pauly, Failing the High Seas: A Global
Evaluation of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, 34 MARINE POL’Y 1036,
1042 (2010); GLOBAL OCEAN COMM’N, supra note 3; Cassandra M. Brooks et al.,
Challenging the ‘Right to Fish’ in a Fast-Changing Ocean, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 289,
297–302, 316–20, 323–24 (2014); White & Costello, supra note 1.
5. GLOBAL OCEAN COMM’N, supra note 3, at 7–8.
6. NIVEDITA M. HOSANEE, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF FLAG STATE DUTIES AS
LAID DOWN UNDER ARTICLE 94 OF THE 1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA 8–9, 56 (2009), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_pro
gramme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/hosanee_0910_mauritious.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5XNZ-4Y8Y].
7. Cullis-Suzuki & Pauly, supra note 4, at 1036 (“two-thirds of stocks fished on
the high seas and under RFMO management are either depleted or overexploited”).
8. White & Costello, supra note 1, at 2–3; Sumaila et al., Winners, supra note 1, at
3.
9. GLOBAL OCEAN COMM’N, supra note 3, at 19, 75.
10. Id. at 75. See also ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 13 (“Focusing on the large
pelagic species for which we have good data, we find that the [ten] leading high-seas
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL111.txt unknown Seq: 4 14-DEC-18 14:40
262 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
ing predicts that many more countries will benefit from higher fish
catches if high seas fishing stops because of the predicted increase in
EEZ fish catches.11 Many developing countries could also benefit.12
To be sure, there are potential risks in stopping fishing on the high
seas. It could increase fishing pressure within EEZs, which conse-
quently would require better management by many countries.13
The proposal to end fishing on the high seas is not as far-fetched as
it might initially sound; partial precedents already exist. In 2017,
“[n]ine nations and the European Union” agreed to keep the high
seas area of the central Arctic Ocean closed to fishing for sixteen
years.14 Fishing for anadromous stocks, such as salmon, is prohibited
“in the high seas areas of the North Pacific Ocean” by the North Pa-
cific Anadromous Fisheries Commission.15 As a result of a 2016 deci-
sion of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources (“CCAMLR”), fishing is prohibited in a vast area of
the high seas in the Southern Ocean off the coast of Antarctica until
2052.16 In 2009, CCAMLR established “[t]he first fully high seas
[marine protected area (“MPA”)] in the South Orkney Islands; this
MPA does not have expiry date.17
fishing nations together land 63% of the high-seas catch and capture 70% of the
landed values, respectively . . . . In other words, [ten] countries reap the largest com-
mercial share of this common heritage of humankind.”). The ten countries are: Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, Spain, United States, Chile, China, Indonesia, Philippines, and
France. Id. at 13 tbl.2. According to Sala et al., high seas fishing is concentrated in
even fewer countries: “Only six countries (China, Taiwan, Japan, Indonesia, Spain,
and South Korea) accounted for 77% of the global high-seas fishing fleet” in 2016,
and in 2014, “[f]ive countries alone accounted for 64% of global high-seas fishing
revenue: China (21%), Taiwan (13%), Japan (11%), South Korea (11%), and Spain
(8%).” Sala et al., supra note 2, at 2 fig.1, 1–2. China has the largest number of vessels
fishing on the high seas. Id. at 2 fig.1; see also Schiller et al., supra note 2, at 2. R
11. White & Costello, supra note 1, at 1–2; Sumaila et al., Winners, supra note 1, at
2–3.
12. Teh et al., supra note 1, at 1, 9–10.
13. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 13.
14. Hannah Hoag, Nations Agree to Fishing Ban in the Arctic Ocean for at Least
16 Years, SCI. (Dec. 1, 2017, 1:30 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/12/na-
tions-agree-ban-fishing-arctic-ocean-least-16-years [https://perma.cc/SE8L-JX9E].
15. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NOAA FISHERIES, IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: JANUARY 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS 54 (2017) [hereinaf-
ter NOAA FISHERIES]. This ban on high seas fishing is enforced by the U.S., working
with “Canada, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation.” Id.
16. Id. at 66; Michelle Innis, Coast of Antarctica Will Host World’s Largest Marine
Reserve, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/aus-
tralia/antarctica-ross-sea-marine-park.html [https://perma.cc/5QAU-UD76].
17. Brooks et al., supra note 4, at 310. The establishment of the South Orkney
Islands MPA likely was facilitated by the fact that there was no ongoing fishing in the
area when the MPA was established. Id. at 311. See also COMM’N FOR THE CONSERVA-
TION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RES., CONSERVATION MEASURE 91-03 (2009),
https://www.ccamlr.org/en/measure-91-03-2009 [https://perma.cc/G67Q-DRY2]. For a
discussion of the small number of other marine protected areas on the high seas, see
Brooks et al., supra note 4, at 309–16.
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This Essay assumes that the idea of ending fishing on the high seas
generally is worth considering. It focuses on the mechanism by which
fishing might be stopped on the high seas.
Jessica Green and Bryce Rudyk have helpfully argued that there
are three broad categories of mechanisms for ending fishing on the
high seas.18 One is a set of multilateral options involving all, or most,
countries. These options include negotiating a framework for closure
through a United Nations (“UN”) process, such as the ongoing negoti-
ations to establish a new implementation agreement under the aus-
pices of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) to
protect biological diversity on the high seas.19 Plurilateral approaches
involving small groups of countries are a second category of option.
Green and Rudyk propose “a club approach,” under which groups of
countries would “condition access” to a desirable good on countries
banning high seas fishing.20 For example, there are some areas of the
high seas, called “donut holes,” that are entirely surrounded by EEZs
of different countries.21 The countries bordering one of these holes
could condition access to their EEZs on not fishing in the donut hole
and in effect form a “donut hole club.”22 The U.S. and Russia have
already excluded countries from fishing in an area of the Bering Sea
surrounded by their EEZs.23 Another option that Green and Rudyk
identify is a “High Seas Ban Club.”24 Under this option, a group of
countries would prohibit fishing vessels that fly their flags from fishing
on the high seas and would refuse to import fish from other countries
whose vessels fish on the high seas—or accept fish from other vessels
fishing on the high seas. The third mechanism for ending high seas
fishing that Green and Rudyk mention is countries acting unilaterally
to reduce high seas fishing by prohibiting high seas fish imports and
prohibiting vessels that fly their flags from fishing on the high seas.
This Essay elaborates and analyzes the potential for the U.S. to act
on its own to reduce fishing on the high seas through: (1) an import
ban on fish caught on the high seas; and (2) a complementary ban on
U.S.-flagged vessels fishing on the high seas. Unilateral action is im-
portant to consider because it might have beneficial consequences in
and of itself, and it may be a first step toward plurilateral or multilat-
18. Jessica Green & Bryce Rudyk, Closing the High Seas to Fishing: A Club Ap-
proach (Dec. 14, 2017) (draft on file with Author).
19. Glen Wright et al., Protect the Neglected Half of Our Blue Planet, NATURE
(Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-01594-1 [https://perma.cc/
E7SN-XY9X].
20. Green & Rudyk, supra note 18, at 2, 4. R
21. Donut Holes in International Waters, DONUTHOLES.CH, http://donutholes.ch/#
[https://perma.cc/5WW6-54C7?type=image].
22. Green & Rudyk, supra note 18, at 4. R
23. Id. at 9–10.
24. Id. at 2.
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eral action that ultimately could prove much more effective in ending
high seas fishing.
This Essay describes the basic idea of a unilateral import ban and
identifies precedents for the idea. It also identifies the advantages and
the disadvantages of countries taking unilateral steps to end high seas
fishing. Because a U.S. move to reduce fishing on the high seas would
involve the U.S. unilaterally conferring a positive externality—leaving
more fish on the high seas, it is reasonable to explore whether the U.S.
might be willing to act unilaterally. This Essay, therefore, addresses
the circumstances under which the U.S. might act unilaterally to ban
high seas fish imports and prohibit its vessels from fishing on the high
seas. The Essay briefly concludes by underscoring the value of the
U.S. taking unilateral steps to end high seas fishing.
II. THE IDEA OF A UNILATERAL IMPORT BAN AND
PRECEDENTS FOR IT
A. The Basic Idea
A relatively small, concentrated number of developed country juris-
dictions, principally Japan, the European Union (“EU”), and the U.S.,
import fish caught on the high seas, which are a luxury product.25
There are no published statistical data on the import markets for fish
caught specifically on the high seas.26 According to data about which
countries import fish generally (not specifically high seas fish), in
25. See, e.g., MATTHEW GIANNI, HIGH SEAS BOTTOM TRAWL FISHERIES AND
THEIR IMPACTS ON THE BIODIVERSITY OF VULNERABLE DEEP-SEA ECOSYSTEMS: OP-
TIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION ix (2004) (most catch from “high-seas bottom
trawl fisheries . . . is sold on the European Union, U.S. and Japanese markets”);
Charles R. Taylor, Fishing with a Bulldozer: Options for Unilateral Action by the
United States Under Domestic and International Law to Halt Destructive Bottom
Trawling Practices in the High Seas, 34 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. POL’Y J. 121, 133 (2010)
(“Fish caught by deep-sea bottom trawlers tend to be luxury goods, and the major
markets for deep-sea bottom trawlers are Japan, the United States, and the European
Union.”); Wilf Swartz et al., Sourcing Seafood For the Three Major Markets: The EU,
Japan and the USA, 31 MARINE POL’Y 1,366, 1,369–71 (2010) (“in many regions, par-
ticularly in the high-seas, consumption by [the EU, Japan and the US] . . . accounts for
over 2/3 of the fisheries catch”); Sala et al., supra note 2, at 8 (“[H]igh-seas fisheries
mainly target catches of high-value species such as tuna, squid, and deep-sea fishes,
which are primarily destined for markets in high-income countries.”); Schiller et. al,
supra note 2, at 6 (“the vast majority of the marine life caught on the high seas is R
destined for upscale markets in food-secure countries”).
26. Schiller et al. explain the difficulty of obtaining such data, as they point out
that “[c]urrent traceability standards do not allow disaggregation of imported seafood
into spatial jurisdictions (that is, caught on the high seas versus in an EEZ).” Schiller
et al., supra note 2, at 2. Schiller et al. provide data on which countries import species R
of fish caught on the high seas. All of the species for which they provide data are
caught on both the high seas and in EEZs, except for Antarctic toothfish, which is
caught only on the high seas. Id. at 2. Due to data limitations, they do not break down
which countries are importing fish caught only on the high seas (except for Antarctic
toothfish, because, as just mentioned, it is caught only on the high seas). Id. at 6–7.
Their data on import markets for fish caught on the high seas (as well as in EEZs)
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2014, the EU, the U.S., and Japan “represented 63 percent by value
and 59 percent by quantity of world imports of fish and fishery prod-
ucts.”27 The EU “is, by far, the largest single market for fish im-
ports.”28 The U.S. is “the largest single importer of fish,” with Japan
second, and China third; Chinese imports have been increasing.29
Given the concentrated nature of the fish import market, it makes
sense to consider whether one or more of the big importers, such as
the U.S., could use their leverage as fish buyers to alter fishing behav-
ior on the high seas. The basic idea proposed in this Essay is that the
U.S. should act on its own to ban the import of fish caught on the high
seas. The U.S. also would likely need to forbid U.S.-flagged vessels
from fishing on the high seas to avoid running afoul of World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) law.30 As discussed in Section IV, the U.S. is
likely better situated than the EU or Japan to act first to protect high
seas fisheries through an import ban because the vast majority of the
U.S. catch is caught within the U.S. EEZ. Thus, the U.S. has fewer
flagged vessels fishing on the high seas than the EU or Japan.31
The U.S. could apply the ban to all fish caught on the high seas.
Alternatively, the U.S. might selectively ban the import of some fish
caught on the high seas—and simultaneously ban its vessels fishing
the same species on the high seas. For example, the U.S.  might ban
the import of severely depleted fish species caught on the high seas,
such as Pacific bluefin tuna,32 or fish caught using a particularly envi-
also suggests that Japan, the EU, and the U.S. are the major import markets for high
seas fish. Id.
27. U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND
AQUACULTURE CONTRIBUTING TO FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION FOR ALL 54
(2016).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. III:4, Art. XX(g), Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. In holding that a U.S. ban on the import of
certain shrimp products was provisionally justified under Article XX(g) of GATT
1994, the WTO Appellate Body carefully analyzed whether the U.S. was regulating its
own shrimp fishers while regulating foreign fishers, as required by the text of Article
XX(g). WTO Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, at paras. 143–45, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted
Oct. 12, 1998), [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle I].
31. See, e.g., Swartz et al., supra note 25, at 1,369 (providing some evidence that
high seas fishing is more important for the EU and Japan than the U.S.: stating that
10% of “fisheries landings by EU countries” came “from the high-seas” in 2001–2005
and implying that 20% of Japanese fish catches occur on the high seas). Under 7% of
the U.S. catch is from the high seas. See also infra note 171 and accompanying text R
(indicating that under 7% of the U.S. catch is from the high seas). Sala et al. also
provide some evidence that high seas fishing is less important for the US than for
Japan, the EU and China. Sala et al., supra note 2, at 2 fig.1 (finding that under 200
U.S.-flagged vessels fished on the high seas in 2016, compared with just under 500
Japanese vessels, 200–300 Spanish vessels, and over 800 Chinese vessels).
32. Amanda Nickson, Urgent Need for Cooperation to Help Severely Depleted Pa-
cific Bluefin Tuna: Countries Responsible for Management of the Species Must Take
Major Steps to Bring It Back from the Brink, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Aug. 24,
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ronmentally damaging fishing technique, such as fish that are bottom
trawled on the high seas.33 Since the early 2000s, the UN General As-
sembly has passed a number of resolutions calling on states and
RFMOs to protect “vulnerable marine ecosystems” on the high seas
from bottom trawling. These resolutions have been imperfectly imple-
mented, “leaving vast areas of ocean unprotected” from bottom trawl-
ing.34 An import ban of bottom trawled high seas fish, or an import
ban on certain depleted fisheries, might be a first step toward banning
all fish caught on the high seas.
In addition to banning its own vessels from high seas fishing and
high seas fish imports, the U.S., or any other banning jurisdiction, pre-
sumably would stop subsidizing high seas fishing by the vessels that it
flags. There would be no point in continuing to subsidize high seas
fishing by the U.S.-flagged fleet if the fleet was banned from fishing
on the high seas. Like agricultural subsidies, fishing subsidies are com-
mon, and there are ongoing efforts to eliminate them through interna-
tional and regional trade negotiations, including in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (“TPP”).35 By itself, curtailing subsidies for
fishing on the high seas might lead to a significant reduction in high
2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/compass-points/2017/
08/24/urgent-need-for-cooperation-to-help-severely-depleted-pacific-bluefin-tuna
[https://perma.cc/3LFF-JVAX] (contrasting the management of the Pacific and Atlan-
tic bluefin tuna fisheries); Anna Fifield, Tuna-fishing Nations Agree on Plan to Re-
plenish Severely Depleted Pacific Bluefin Tuna Stocks, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/tuna-fishing-nations-agree-on-
plan-to-replenish-severely-depleted-bluefin-stocks/2017/09/01/7d83c314-8db0-11e7-
91d5-ab4e4bb76a3a_story.html?utm_term=.98987c4ed1a8 [https://perma.cc/Q8QE-
GUTK].
33. For an earlier argument that the U.S. should use unilateral trade measures to
end bottom trawling on the high seas, see Taylor, supra note 25, at 125–26. “Bottom
trawling is a fishing method by which fishing vessels drag large nets across the ocean
floor and across the tops of seamounts”; it is compared to “clear-cutting an entire
forest to catch a few deer.” Id. Taylor advocates that the U.S. impose trade sanctions
against countries whose vessels bottom trawl on the high seas, using the Pelly Amend-
ment and the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthori-
zation Act of 2006. Id. at 127, 143, 152. “[B]ottom trawling is the most commonly
deployed method of high-seas bottom fishing, accounting for 80% of the bottom catch
in the deep sea.” Id. at 132. This Essay suggests that the U.S. could prohibit importers
from importing fish caught on the high seas into the U.S.
34. MATTHEW GIANNI ET AL., HOW MUCH LONGER WILL IT TAKE? A TEN-YEAR
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESO-
LUTIONS 61/105, 64/72 AND 66/68 ON THE MANAGEMENT OF BOTTOM FISHERIES IN
AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 5 (Aug. 2016). See also id. at 5–7 (listing
“shortcomings” in implementation of UN General Assembly resolutions on bottom
trawling).
35. GLOBAL OCEAN COMM’N, supra note 3, at 45–46; Margaret Young, Energy
Transitions and Trade Law: Lessons From the Reform of Fisheries Subsidies, 17 INT’L
ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 371, 377–81 (2017). The Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership includes “prohibitions on some of the most
harmful fisheries subsidies, as well as enhanced transparency requirements for fisher-
ies subsidy programs.” NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15, at 51 (referring to an earlier
version of TPP). See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
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seas fishing. There is evidence that the removal of government subsi-
dies, such as those for vessel fuel costs, would render some fishing on
the high seas unprofitable.36
Japan provides the largest subsidies to high seas fishing specifically,
followed by Spain, “China, South Korea, and the United States.”37 So,
there is an overlap between the major importers of high seas fish and
the main subsidizers of high seas fishing; Japan, the U.S., and the EU
are major importers and subsidizers.38 The overlap suggests banning
the import of high seas fishing could be an indirect means of curtailing
subsidies for high seas fishing and of advancing the broader goal of
reducing subsidies for fishing generally, not just on the high seas.39
B. Precedents
The idea of countries using import bans to alter fishing behavior is
not novel. There are precedents for using such bans to improve fishing
behavior within EEZs and on the high seas.
There are three major elements to keep in mind while considering a
unilateral ban by the U.S. on imports of fish caught on the high seas.
First, the country would apply its own standard to protect fish. The
U.S.—not a multilateral or plurilateral organization like an RFMO—
would determine that fish should not be caught on the high seas. Sec-
ond, the country would require that importers—not foreign states—
have evidence that fish they are proposing to bring into the country
were not caught on the high seas. So, the immediate burden of the ban
would fall on private actors. However, the ban might have reverbera-
Partnership art. 20.16, Feb. 21, 2018; Young, supra, at 380–81 (analyzing provisions of
the original TPP dealing with fishing subsidies).
36. Sala et al., supra note 2, at 3 (“without subsidies and/or low wage labor com-
pensation, more than half of currently fished high seas fishing grounds would not be
profitable at present exploitation rates”); id. (“We estimate that deep-sea bottom
trawling would not be globally profitable at current rates without government subsi-
dies, with maximum annual losses of $230 million before subsidies.”); GLOBAL
OCEAN COMM’N, supra note 3, at 45 (“[S]ubsidies for the high-seas bottom trawl
fleets of the 12 top high-seas bottom trawling nations amount to US$152 million per
year, which represents 25% of the total landed value of the fleet. Typically, the profit
achieved by this vessel group is not more than 10% of landed value, meaning that this
industry effectively operates at a deficit.”); id. at 46 (“On the high-seas, it is largely
only States that can afford to subsidi[z]e their fleets with public funds that have the
opportunity to fish: high-seas fishing is carried out by [ten] nations that rely heavily on
subsidies to remain profitable. Fuel subsidies account for the greatest share of these
capacity-enhancing subsidies, representing up to 30% of government fishing spend-
ing.”); Taylor, supra note 25, at 133 (“deep-sea bottom trawling only survives as an
industry because of massive government subsidies that cover fuel and other fishing
vessel costs”).
37. Sala et al., supra note 2, at 3.
38. The EU is a major importer of high seas fish; Spain, a major subsidizer of high
seas fishing, is an EU member.
39. Rob Fischman suggested to me another way of using a unilateral ban to pro-
tect fisheries: a nation-state might curtail its own subsidies for fishing and then unilat-
erally ban the import of fish caught using subsidies.
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tions back to flag states; importers might seek confirmation from flag
states that their vessels are complying with the requisite standards.
Third, the sanctions for violating these standards must include an im-
port prohibition.
The following sub-section identifies U.S. and EU precedents for an
import ban on high seas fish, highlighting the elements that the prece-
dents have in common with the proposal.40
1. U.S. Precedents
For clarity, U.S. precedents that place burdens on private actors are
discussed first. Then, the Essay turns to U.S. measures targeted at for-
eign governments.
a. Authorities Targeting Private Actors
i. The U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring Program
U.S. law prohibits importing or selling fish taken contrary to the
fishing laws of another country or RFMO regulations.41 The Seafood
Import Monitoring Program (“SIMP”) is a new program that took ef-
fect on January 1, 2018, that attempts to ensure that fish imported into
the U.S.—like fish harvested by U.S.-flagged vessels—are caught in
compliance with fisheries regulations established by RFMOs and
40. For an overview of trade measures used by RFMOs, the EU and the U.S. to
address Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (“IUU”) fishing, see GILLES HOSCH,
TRADE MEASURES TO COMBAT IUU FISHING: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF UNILAT-
ERAL AND MULTILATERAL APPROACHES 27 (2016). While this Essay discusses many
of the same trade measures as Hosch, this Essay categorizes them slightly differently.
Hosch separately discusses multilateral and unilateral measures. In discussing multi-
lateral measures, he focuses on catch documentation systems implemented by
RFMOs. In discussing unilateral measures, he distinguishes catch documentation
schemes and regimes for identifying and certifying countries that may impose trade
sanctions based on failures to counter IUU fishing. Id.
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(Q) (2012) (“It is unlawful . . . to import, export, transport,
sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce any fish taken,
possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any foreign law or regulation or any
treaty or in contravention of any binding conservation measure adopted by an inter-
national agreement or organization to which the United States is a party.”); 50 CFR
§ 600.725(a) (“It is unlawful for any person to . . . (a) Possess, have custody or control
of, ship, transport, offer for sale, sell, purchase, land, import, export or re-export, any
fish or parts thereof taken or retained in violation of the Magnuson–Stevens Act or
any other statute administered by NOAA or any regulation or permit issued thereun-
der, or import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or
foreign commerce any fish taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any
foreign law or regulation, or any treaty or in contravention of a binding conservation
measure adopted by an international agreement or organization to which the United
States is a party.”); 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1) (2012) (“It is unlawful for any person . . . to
import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife or
plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law, treaty, or regula-
tion of the United States or in violation of any Indian tribal law.”).
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other countries, and are not mislabeled.42 The SIMP was established
by the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) following a rec-
ommendation from the Obama-era Presidential Task Force on Com-
bating [illegal, unreported, and unregulated (“IUU”)] Fishing and
Seafood Fraud.43 NMFS and Customs and Border Protection in the
Department of Homeland Security are implementing the SIMP.44
The program requires approximately 2,000 importers “to collect in-
formation about each stage of the supply chain for certain types of
seafood imported into the United States, starting from the catch’s
point of origin.”45 The requirements currently apply to only a list of
priority species, which appear to have been selected based on a num-
ber of factors, including: the risk that they are caught in violation of
RFMO and other countries’ fisheries regulations, the potential for the
fish to be mislabeled (“seafood fraud”), and the existence of compara-
ble reporting requirements for U.S. fishers of these species.46 The
“priority species represents 39% of edible seafood imports by volume
in 2014 and, because of the high value of several of the priority spe-
42. The SIMP was established by rule-making, relying on 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(Q).
See Alfa Int’l Seafood v. Ross, 264 F. Supp. 3d 23, 34, 49–53 (D.D.C. 2017).
43. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COMBATING IUU FISHING AND SEAFOOD
FRAUD, ACTION PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS
36–39 (2015) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE].
44. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Magnuson–Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Seafood Import Monitoring Program,
Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,975 (Dec. 9, 2016) [hereinafter NOAA 2016 Final Rule].
The program was challenged by seafood importers, and upheld, in Alfa Int’l Seafood,
264 F. Supp. 3d at 68.
45. Alfa Int’l Seafood, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 30. See also Final Rule to Implement U.S.
Seafood Import Monitoring Program RIN 0648-BF09, Final Regulatory Impact Re-
view and Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis at 3, 6 (referring to “[a]pproximately
2,000 importers”) [hereinafter Final Regulatory Impact Review].
46. Presidential Task Force on Combating Illegal Unreported and Unregulated
(IUU) Fishing and Seafood Fraud, Action Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 66,867 (Oct. 30, 2015);
NOAA 2016 Final Rule, supra note 44, at 88,989 (explaining stay of rule as to shrimp
and abalone); Alfa Int’l Seafood, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 54–55. The species are “abalone,
Atlantic cod, blue crab, dolphinfish, grouper, king crab (red), Pacific cod, red snapper,
sea cucumber, sharks, shrimp, swordfish, albacore tuna, bluefin tuna, bigeye tuna,
skipjack tuna, and yellowfin tuna.” NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15, at 14. According
to NMFS, comparable reporting requirements are already imposed on domestic U.S.
fishers for these priority species. Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act; Seafood Import Monitoring Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 6,210, 6,212 (pro-
posed Feb. 5, 2016) [hereinafter NOAA Proposed Rule]. This is presumably
important in reducing the legal risk that the program violates WTO law prohibitions
on discriminating against like imported products. China has already objected that
comparable reporting requirements are not imposed on U.S. fishers. WORLD TRADE
ORG., SANITARY & PHYTOSANITARY INFO. MGMT. SYS. (2018), http://spsims.wto.org/
en/SpecificTradeConcerns/View/415 [https://perma.cc/MSN2-UH7N]; Chris Loew,
WWF Report Urges Japan to Adopt Monitoring Program, IUU WATCH (Oct. 9, 2017),
http://www.iuuwatch.eu/2017/10/wwf-report-urges-japan-adopt-monitoring-program/
[https://perma.cc/J7GF-5QSV].
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cies, about 46% of imports by value.”47 NMFS plans to selectively au-
dit the information that importers provide.48 If NMFS cannot confirm
that the fish were “lawfully acquired and non-fraudulent” based on
the information that the importers provide, then the fish could be ex-
cluded from the U.S. and subject to forfeiture. The importer could
also face “enforcement action.”49
The SIMP is an important precedent for a ban on the import of high
seas fish in two respects. First, like such a ban, the program imposes a
burden on importers to know their product back to the point of har-
vest. Naturally, the ability to identify which fish were caught on the
high seas would be essential to implementing an import ban on high
seas fish. Second, the penalties for non-compliance include the exclu-
sion of the fish, as would be the case with a ban.
Still, a ban on importing fish caught on the high seas would push the
envelope compared with the SIMP in two other respects. First, while
the SIMP requires that importers acquire location information on
where the fish was caught, it is unclear whether the SIMP requires
knowing this location with the specificity needed to implement a ban
on importing high seas fish.50 Second, the SIMP involves the U.S. im-
47. Final Regulatory Impact Review, supra note 45, at 3. See also id. at 7 (“The
commodities subject to documentation requirements under the initial phase of the
program amounted to about 50% of 2014 import value.”). In April 2018, NMFS an-
nounced that shrimp and abalone will be subject to SIMP by the end of 2018, in
compliance with Congressional requirements. NOAA FISHERIES, U.S. Seafood Im-
port Monitoring Program to Include Shrimp and Abalone by December 31 (Apr. 23,
2018), https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/feature-story/us-seafood-import-monitoring-
program-include-shrimp-and-abalone-december-31 [https://perma.cc/S6JK-X7JX].
48. NOAA 2016 Final Rule, supra note 44, at 88,992.
49. Id.
50. Implementing an import ban on fish caught on the high seas likely would re-
quire fine-grained information on the location of the harvest, as the U.S. would allow
importing fish caught in EEZs (provided it was caught in compliance with national
laws) while the same fish caught on the high seas would be excluded. NOAA’s Final
Rule for the SIMP states that the harvest location of fish caught on the high seas
should be identified using FAO Major Fishing Area codes. NOAA 2016 Final Rule,
supra note 44, at 88,980 (“For fishing beyond national jurisdiction, the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization Major Fishing Area codes (http://www.fao.org/
fishery/cwp/handbook/H/en) should be used. Specific instructions for reporting fishing
area are provided in the NMFS Implementation Guide.”). See Coordinating Working
Party on Fishery Statistics (“CWP”), U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/
cwp-on-fishery-statistics/handbook/general-concepts/major-fishing-areas-general/en/
(last visited Aug. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/MDW6-AYRW]. According to Anastasia
Telesetsky, using these codes will not provide detailed information about the harvest
location. Anastasia Telesetsky, U.S. Seafood Traceability as Food Law and the Future
of Marine Fisheries, 47 ENVTL. L. 765, 779–80, 789 (2017). However, when I asked
NMFS about the choice to require catch area identification in terms of FAO Fishing
Areas, NMFS indicated that they actually may be requiring a more specific descrip-
tion of catch area than Telesetsky implies. NMFS responded as follows: “NMFS regu-
lations and the import reporting system allow for specification of fishing area as
established by the competent authority and/or the applicable RFMO. In cases where
there are no specific fishing areas identified/required by a competent authority, the
fishing vessel should report landings by FAO area, and . . . indicate whether the fish-
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plementing standards determined by international bodies—like
RFMOs—and other countries. By contrast, a ban to protect high seas
fish would involve the U.S. enforcing a U.S. policy of ending fishing
on the high seas.
ii. U.S. Experience with Catch Documentation Schemes
The new SIMP builds on pre-existing RFMO catch documentation
programs implemented by the U.S., other U.S. documentation re-
quirements for fisheries, and the EU catch certification scheme dis-
cussed below.51
The U.S. is one of thirty countries implementing CCAMLR’s tooth-
fish catch documentation scheme.52 CCAMLR regulates catches of
ing occurred within a nation’s EEZ for that FAO area.” Email from Kerry Turner,
Comms. Specialist, NOAA Fisheries Office of Int’l Affairs and Seafood Inspection, to
Author (Jan. 19, 2018, 18:20 CST) (on file with Author).
It should be possible to provide highly specific information on the location of the
harvest. The EU’s catch certification scheme apparently requires that the harvest lo-
cation be described using GPS coordinates. NOAA 2016 Final Rule, supra note 44, at
88,980. However, the EU regulation, while requiring that the location of the catch be
identified, does not state on the form included in the regulation how the location
should be defined. Council Regulation 1005/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 286) 27 (EC) (Annex
II, Item 3 of the European Community Catch Certificate and Re-export Certificate
requires “catch area(s) and dates”). See also EURO. COMM’N DIRECTORATE-GEN-
ERAL FOR MARITIME AFFAIRS & FISHERIES, HANDBOOK ON THE PRACTICAL APPLI-
CATION OF COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO. 1005/2008 OF 29 SEPTEMBER 2008
ESTABLISHING A COMMUNITY SYSTEM TO PREVENT, DETER, AND ELIMINATE ILLE-
GAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING (THE IUU REGULATION) 39 (2009),
http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/kakou/eu/pdf/handbook_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P8W-
NJVF]. GPS coordinates will be used to identify the location of “any transshipment at
sea” in CCAMLR’s catch documentation scheme. NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15,
at 52.
51. For an overview of pre-existing catch documentation programs implemented
by NMFS, see NOAA Proposed Rule, supra note 46, at 6219. Hosch reports that
there are three RFMOs that have catch documentation schemes, and that collectively
they “cover substantially less than 0.1 percent of world catch by volume”: CCAMLR
for Patagonian and Antarctic toothfish, the International Commission for the Conser-
vation of Atlantic Tunas for “[w]estern and eastern stocks of Atlantic bluefin tuna,”
and the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (“CCSBT”) for
one stock of “southern bluefin tuna.” HOSCH, supra note 40, at 10–11. CCAMLR’s
toothfish catch documentation scheme is the only one of the three RFMO catch docu-
mentation schemes that is electronic. Id. at 11. The FAO defines a Catch Documenta-
tion Scheme as “a system with the primary purpose of helping determine throughout
the supply chain whether fish originate from catches taken consistent with the appli-
cable national, regional and international conservation and management measures,
established in accordance with relevant international obligations.” U.N. FOOD &
AGRIC. ORG., VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES FOR CATCH DOCUMENTATION SCHEMES 2
(2017), http://www.fao.org/publications/card/en/c/a6abc11e-414a-491b-888a-
7819dabdac1d [https://perma.cc/5S43-45KA].
52. Importing and Exporting Antarctic Marine Living Resources and Obtaining
Permits, NOAA FISHERIES (Oct. 16, 2017), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/permits/amlr
.html [https://perma.cc/F3T7-4PGJ]; 50 C.F.R. §§ 300.100–.119 (2016). For back-
ground, see Henrik Osterblom & Ussif Rashid Sumaila, Toothfish Crises, Actor Di-
versity, and the Emergence of Compliance Mechanisms in the Southern Ocean, 21
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Antarctic and Patagonia toothfish, which are commonly called Chil-
ean sea bass.53 To promote compliance with CCAMLR’s toothfish
regulations, every shipment of toothfish imported into the U.S. must
include a “Dissostichus [toothfish] catch document” (“DCD”) that is
validated by the harvesting vessel’s flag state.54 In validating the docu-
ment, the flag state must satisfy itself “through the use of [Vessel
Monitoring System] . . . data . . . that the [Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization (“FAO”)] . . . area(s) or CCAMLR subarea(s) or divi-
sion(s) where the [toothfish] . . . were taken was accurately reported
by the vessel on the DCD.”55 So, the toothfish scheme is an example
of a regime where an entity—in this case, the flag state—is required to
know the location where fish was caught; this information would be
essential to implementing an import ban on high seas fish.
The U.S. also has implemented a catch documentation scheme de-
veloped by the International Commission for the Conservation of At-
lantic Tunas (“ICCAT”) that is similar to the CCAMLR scheme.56 In
addition, the U.S. has a domestically developed regime that regulates
the use of the “dolphin-safe” label on tuna sold in the U.S. For the
label to be applied to tuna, the captain of the harvesting vessel—and
an independent observer in some fisheries—must make certifications
about the circumstances in which the tuna was caught, and the vessel
must keep tuna caught in ways that harmed dolphins separate from
the dolphin-safe tuna.57 This regime is different from those mentioned
above because it indirectly imposes substantive standards on tuna fish-
ing by regulating the ability to apply a dolphin-safe label on tuna sold
in the U.S.
b. Authorities Targeting Flag States
Several statutory provisions authorize the NMFS, or another fed-
eral actor, to restrict fish imports from countries that fail to ensure
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 972 (2011). For a positive assessment of the impact of the
toothfish documentation scheme, see HOSCH, supra note 40, at 21–26.
53. CCAMLR has a broader mandate than other RFMOs. Brooks et al., supra
note 4, at 303–06, 317–18, 321.
54. COMM’N FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RES., CON-
SERVATION MEASURE 10-05, CATCH DOCUMENTATION SCHEME FOR DISSOSTICHUS
SPP. para. 1(i) (2017); 50 C.F.R. § 300.106(a) (2016).
55. COMM’N FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RES., CON-
SERVATION MEASURE 10-05, CATCH DOCUMENTATION SCHEME FOR DISSOSTICHUS
SPP. para. 5 (2017); see also id. (“The Flag State’s CDS Contact Officer shall not issue
a Flag State Confirmation Number on a DCD if there is reason to believe that the
information submitted by the vessel is inaccurate or that the Dissostichus spp. were
taken in a manner inconsistent with CCAMLR conservation measures if fishing oc-
curred in the CAMLR Convention Area.”).
56. NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15, at 52; Telesetsky, supra note 50, at 777–78.
57. For a description of the requirements for tuna to be labelled dolphin-safe, see
WORLD TRADE ORG., ART. 21.5, UNITED STATES – MEASURES CONCERNING THE
IMPORTATION, MARKETING AND SALE OF TUNA AND TUNA PRODUCTS, paras.
7.48–.71 (Oct. 2017) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin Panels].
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that vessels flying their flag comply with U.S. standards or interna-
tional law.58 These authorities differ from the proposed import ban on
high seas fish because the authorities penalize countries—rather than
private actors such as importers—by putting the burden on flag states
to enforce fisheries regulations against vessels. In other respects, the
authorities set helpful precedents for using trade measures to alter
fishing practices. Also, some of these precedents can be used to en-
force U.S.—rather than international—fishing standards against
foreign-flagged vessels, including: the Moratorium Protection Act
§ 1826k (equivalent conservation measures); Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act;59 International Dolphin Conservation Program Act;60 and
Shrimp Turtle Law.61
For example, under the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium
Protection Act (the “Moratorium Protection Act”), NMFS is required
“to identify countries whose fishing vessels were engaged in IUU fish-
ing or certain other activities,” such as illegally fishing in U.S. wa-
ters.62 If an identified country does not address the activities resulting
in its identification after consultations, the U.S. may ban fish imports
from that country and deny port privileges to the country’s vessels. In
58. For useful summaries of the statutory provisions authorizing trade-related
measures to alter fishing practices abroad, see NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15, at
86–88 (Annex 2: United States Laws Addressing IUU Fishing, PLMR Bycatch, and
Shark Conservation, including Summaries of Recent Enforcement Cases); NOAA
Proposed Rule, supra note 46, at 6219.
59. NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15, at 5, 12–13, 69; Fish and Fish Product Import
Provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 54,389, 54,390 (Aug.
15, 2016); Rob Williams et al., U.S. Seafood Import Restriction Presents Opportunity
and Risk, 354 SCI. 1,372, 1,373 (Dec. 16, 2016).
60. NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15, at 13; see also 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(f)(8)
(2018).
61. NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15, at 67, 87; 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (2012); Depart-
ments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appro-
priations Act, Pub. L. No. 101–62, § 609 (1989).
There are other provisions allowing for the penalization of states. The High Seas
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act allows “identification of nations whose vessels
are engaging in high seas fishing with large-scale driftnets; such identification may
lead to limitations on port entry and on the importation of certain products from
those nations.” NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15, at 86–87. “The Pelly Amendment to
the Fishermen’s Protective Act provides for the possibility of trade-restrictive mea-
sures when the Secretary of Commerce certifies to the President that nationals of a
foreign country are” fishing in ways that undermine international fisheries regula-
tions. Id. at 13. The President can order the Treasury Secretary “to prohibit the impor-
tation of products from the certified country.” Id. at 13. The Pelly Amendment was
passed to enforce the ban on fishing salmon in the high seas in the Northwest Atlan-
tic. Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis of
the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U.J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 751, 758 (1994).
62. NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15, at 3; see also PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE,
supra note 43, at 7; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826j–k (2012). The process for identifying a country
under the Moratorium Protection Act is described in NOAA FISHERIES, supra note
15, at 17–45. For a critical analysis of the implementation of the Moratorium Protec-
tion Act, see HOSCH, supra note 40, at 38–43.
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its 2017 report to Congress, NMFS identified “Ecuador and the Rus-
sian Federation, as having been engaged in IUU fishing based on re-
ported violations of international conservation and management
measures during 2014, 2015 or 2016.”63 It also identified “Mexico and
the Russian Federation, as having vessels that fished without authori-
zation in waters of the United States.”64 In addition, Mexico was iden-
tified “for overfishing stocks shared with the United States.”65 NMFS
did not prohibit the importation of fish from any of these countries,
although Mexico “was subject to denial of port privileges and import
restrictions on certain fish and fish products.”66 The U.S. has never
banned the import of fish from a country even though it has identified
many countries under the Moratorium Protection Act.67
2. EU Precedents
The U.S. is not the only major seafood importer to use import bans,
and the threat of them, to alter fishing practices abroad. The EU has a
catch certification scheme under which it imposes obligations on flag
state governments to ensure compliance with international fisheries
regulations, such as RFMO regulations, and the domestic laws of the
countries where fish are harvested.68 The EU adopted the certification
scheme regulation in 2008 and implemented it in 2010.69 All fish im-
ported into the EU—not just priority seafood as under the U.S. SIMP
program—must include a “catch certificate which certifies compliance
with fisheries laws and conservation measures.”70 This catch certifi-
cate must include a certification from the harvesting vessel’s flag state
attesting “to the origin and legality of the fish.”71 In other words, the
63. NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15, at 4.
64. Id. at 4; see also id. at 29–30, 32.
65. Id. at 4.
66. NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, IMPROV-
ING INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2017 IUU BIEN-
NIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2017), https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/feature-story/
improving-international-fisheries-management-highlights-2017-iuu-biennial-report
[https://perma.cc/T83N-SUZC]. In light of Mexico’s subsequent corrective actions,
NMFS has now positively certified Mexico. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ADDENDUM
TO THE BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 403(A) OF THE
MAGNUSON–STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT REAUTHORIZA-
TION ACT OF 2006: POSITIVE CERTIFICATION DETERMINATION FOR MEXICO’S 2015
IUU FISHING IDENTIFICATION (2018), https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/foreign/interna-
tional-affairs/identification-iuu-fishing-activities [https://perma.cc/Q723-2KFV].
67. HOSCH, supra note 40, at 43.
68. ENVTL. JUSTICE FOUND. ET AL., THE EU IUU REGULATION: BUILDING ON
SUCCESS, EU PROGRESS IN THE GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL FISHING 7 (2016).
For a critical analysis of the EU catch certification scheme, see HOSCH, supra note 40,
at 28–31. The EU catch certification scheme is equivalent to a catch documentation
scheme. Id. at 27 n.33.
69. ENVTL. JUSTICE FOUND. ET AL., supra note 68, at 6.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 7; see also Council Regulation 1005/2008, Community system to prevent,
deter and eliminate IUU fishing, 2008 O.J. (L. 286) 1, 2 (EC).
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location where the fish was harvested must be identified, and the flag
state must certify that it was caught in compliance with domestic and
international fisheries regulations.72 EU countries selectively audit the
accuracy of the catch certificates received with fish imports.73 Fish
caught in violation of applicable law are denied “entry into the EU.”74
In addition to the catch certification scheme administered by EU
countries, the European Commission administers a “carding process”
that is similar to the Moratorium Protection Act.75 The Commission
investigates whether countries are implementing their obligations as
“flag, coastal, port or market states under international law.”76 If the
Commission determines that a country is “non-cooperating” it may
“yellow-card” the country.77 To have the yellow card removed, and be
“green-carded,” the country must improve its compliance with inter-
national fisheries regulations.78 If the country does not introduce re-
forms, it may be “red-carded,” which results in the EU banning its
seafood imports.79 The catch certification and carding processes are
distinct; countries can be carded for failing to comply with the catch
certification scheme or failing to comply with international fisheries
regulations.80 According to a 2016 NGO report, the EU has interacted
“with almost 50 third countries seeking improvements in measures to
combat IUU fishing.”81 The EU has yellow-carded twenty countries;
nine of these twenty have “been delisted.”82 Four countries have been
red-carded.83 The EU is identifying very different countries under the
carding regime than the U.S. is under its equivalent Moratorium Pro-
tection Act.84 While the U.S. tends to identify countries that are
known to engage in IUU fishing, including EU countries,85 almost half
of the countries that the EU has carded were not exporting seafood to
the EU when they were carded, which seemingly may not cause a
country to alter its fishing behavior.86 Nonetheless, the EU carding
regime may be more effective in inducing countries to reduce IUU
72. Council Regulation No. 1005/2008, Preamble (15), art. 12 & Annex II (EC).
73. ENVTL. JUSTICE FOUND. ET AL., supra note 68, at 7.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 8. See EU IUU Regulation, art. 31; HOSCH, supra note 40, at 32–38.
76. ENVTL. JUSTICE FOUND. ET AL., supra note 68, at 8. See also HOSCH, supra
note 40, at 33.
77. ENVTL. JUSTICE FOUND. ET AL., supra note 68, at 19 n.15 (citing EU IUU
Regulation, art. 31(2)).
78. Id. at 9.
79. Id.
80. HOSCH, supra note 40, at 32.
81. ENVTL. JUSTICE FOUND. ET AL., supra note 68, at 8.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. HOSCH, supra note 40, at 42 (only three countries have been identified by the
U.S. and the EU: “Panama, Ghana, and Korea”).
85. Id. at 42, 56.
86. Id. at 35 (“over 43 percent of the identified countries (10/23) . . . had no estab-
lished seafood trade to the EU market”).
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fishing because the EU, unlike the U.S., has imposed trade sanctions
as a result of country identifications.87
All of the programs highlighted above suggest that there are prece-
dents for the three key elements of a unilateral import ban on fish
caught on the high seas, although there is no single existing program
that combines all three elements. First, there are precedents for a
country acting unilaterally to enforce substantive fishing standards
that it has established on its own, not as a member of an RFMO: the
Moratorium Protection Act § 1826k (equivalent conservation mea-
sures), Marine Mammal Protection Act, International Dolphin Con-
servation Program Act, and Shrimp Turtle Law. Second, there is a
precedent for putting the burden on importers to know the location
where their product is harvested—the U.S. SIMP. There are more
precedents for requiring flag states to know the locations where their
vessels are harvesting: the CCAMLR, ICCAT, and CCSBT catch doc-
umentation schemes and the EU catch certification regime. Third,
there are precedents for using import bans to penalize countries for
non-compliance with fisheries regulations: the U.S. SIMP, CCAMLR
catch documentation scheme, Moratorium Protection Act § 1826k,
Marine Mammal Protection Act, International Dolphin Conservation
Program Act, Shrimp Turtle Law, Pelly Amendment, EU catch certifi-
cation system, and EU carding process. Some precedents provide for
import bans on specific fish shipments because they do not comply
with fishing standards, while other precedents allow for import bans
on fish generally from a country whose flagged vessels are deemed
non-compliant.88
With these precedents demonstrating the potential for an import
ban on high seas fish, the Essay turns to the advantages and disadvan-
tages of unilateral trade bans to end high seas fishing.
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A
UNILATERAL IMPORT BAN
A. Advantages
Because the high seas are not under the control of nation states and
everyone has a “conditional” right to fish on the high seas, it is natural
to think that ending fishing on the high seas will require the multilat-
eral agreement of all countries through a UN-led process.89 However,
trying to negotiate the end of high seas fishing through a UN process
87. Id. at 38, 43, 46, 48. For another analysis of the impacts of the EU’s catch
certification system and carding regime, see ENVTL. JUSTICE FOUND. ET AL., THE IM-
PACT OF THE EU IUU REGULATION ON SEAFOOD TRADE FLOWS (2018).
88. For a critique of the breadth of the import prohibitions under the EU carding
regime, see HOSCH, supra note 40, at 52.
89. Brooks et al. aptly emphasize that there is no absolute right to fish on the high
seas; under UNCLOS, the right to fish on the high seas is “conditional” on conserving
“the marine environment.” Brooks et al., supra note 4, at 293; see also id. at 295–96.
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is likely to be cumbersome and time-consuming and, ultimately, may
not succeed. As an example, in 2017, the UN General Assembly
agreed to negotiate a new implementing agreement under UNCLOS
to protect biological diversity on the high seas. The process of per-
suading the General Assembly to proceed with a new agreement ad-
dressing Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdictions (“BBNJ”)
actually started in 2004.90
A single jurisdiction taking unilateral steps likely would be able to
proceed much faster than a multilateral UN-led process like the BBNJ
negotiations. Also, the BBNJ negotiations might be given further im-
petus by a country taking unilateral steps to ban high seas fishing. The
negotiation of UNCLOS proceeded in tandem with countries, includ-
ing the U.S., unilaterally expanding their claims to ocean fisheries.91
One jurisdiction taking unilateral steps also might be a first step
toward plurilateral efforts like the “High Seas Ban Club” that Green
and Rudyk propose, or toward a multilateral effort to negotiate a high
seas fish reserve. Such plurilateral and multilateral efforts require at
least one national champion to make headway, and a first mover
could become that champion. To create momentum, the first mover
could expressly invite other countries to implement similar bans and
establish a regime that is open to other countries to join.92
One jurisdiction’s experience implementing an import ban, and
banning its own vessels from fishing on the high seas, also might pro-
vide lessons for other countries. For example, the U.S. decision to im-
plement its SIMP “was informed by the early success of the European
Union’s Catch Documentation Program in reducing IUU fishing and
seafood fraud in the European Union.”93
With a ban in place in one jurisdiction, it likely would be cheaper
and easier for other jurisdictions to implement similar bans. As men-
tioned above, the EU implemented its catch certification scheme for
all imports in 2010, eight years before the U.S. implemented its SIMP
in 2018. The final regulatory impact review for the SIMP suggested
that fishing entities in countries exporting to both the U.S. and EU
countries would be able to comply with the SIMP at minimal cost be-
90. Id. at 314.
91. In 1976, “the U.S. Congress established a 200-mile fishery conservation and
management zone.” ANN L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA 314, 353 (1981).
92. See HOSCH, supra note 40, at ix (proposing that catch documentation schemes
implemented unilaterally by the EU and the U.S. might be linked, to form multilat-
eral schemes that Hosch believes would be more effective in combatting IUU fishing);
id. at 59 (merged unilateral catch documentation systems “could then be opened up
for expanded end-market state membership”).
93. Alfa Int’l Seafood v. Ross, 264 F. Supp. 3d 23, 59 (D.D.C. 2017).
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cause these countries are already complying with the EU catch certifi-
cation scheme.94
B. Disadvantages
On the other hand, downsides exist to trying to end high seas fishing
through a unilateral import ban.95
1. Leakage
One disadvantage is the potential for displacement—or leakage—of
high seas fish and fishing vessels.96
First, vessels might continue high seas fishing, and merely sell their
product to countries without a ban. The U.S. and the EU seem like
the best candidates for introducing an import ban on fish caught on
the high seas, given their significance as markets for imported high
seas fish and their track records in establishing unilateral programs to
promote respect for fisheries regulations. But even if one or both of
them acted unilaterally, there still would be other markets that might
be able to absorb the fish that the U.S. and the EU would no longer
allow to enter their markets.97 To be sure, there may be limits to
where high seas fish will be displaced. Many high seas fish, such as
bluefin tuna, are luxury products that are unlikely to be affordable to
many people in developing countries.98 But there are emerging mar-
94. Final Regulatory Impact Review, supra note 45, at 7. See also id. at 9–10 (“The
data required to be provided by the harvester to the U.S. importer aligns very closely
with the data requirements of the European Union catch certification program and
several RFMO schemes. Providing this information to buyers for the U.S. program
should be no more costly or burdensome.”); Alfa Int’l Seafood, 264 F. Supp. 3d at
64–65.
95. The three risks that this Essay identifies are similar to the three risks that
Green & Rudyk identify with the high seas ban club option. Green & Rudyk, supra
note 18, at 6 (“There are three issues that may limit the effectiveness of a high-seas
ban club: sufficient monitoring/transparency, preventing leakage, and concordance
with existing international law.”).
96. Green & Rudyk use the term “leakage.” Green & Rudyk, supra note 18, at 6.
97. Leakage is a concern with unilateral measures to address global environmental
problems in general. Although he does not use the term leakage, Hosch similarly
warns that unilateral catch documentation schemes are more effective if the jurisdic-
tion has a dominant market share, because market dominance reduces the scope for
diverting the fish covered by the scheme to other countries without comparable regu-
latory requirements. HOSCH, supra note 40, at 21–22, 27, 48–49, 54, 58. However,
multilateral as well as unilateral catch documentation schemes may have greater im-
pact if there is a dominant end-market state for the fish. Hosch partially attributes the
success of the multilateral catch documentation schemes implemented by CCAMLR
for toothfish, and ICCAT and the CCSBT for tuna, to the fact that there are states
that purchase a dominant share of the covered fish (Japan for tuna, and the U.S. for
toothfish). Id. at 19, 21.
98. Schiller et al., supra note 2; see also Fifield, supra note 32 (describing Japan as R
“by far the world’s biggest consumer of bluefin, eating about 80 percent of the global
haul in the $42 billion tuna industry,” and noting that “Pacific bluefin is particularly
prized in Japan for its fatty underbelly, called “otoro,” which sells for as much as $23
per piece at Michelin-starred sushi restaurants in Tokyo”).
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kets to which such fish might be diverted if it is not allowed to be sold
in the U.S. or the EU. Furthermore, the price of high seas fish might
decline in the face of bans that reduce demand, making the fish more
affordable. For example, China might increase its high seas fish im-
ports. China is already the third biggest national importer of seafood
generally—not specifically high seas fish—and its seafood imports are
increasing as a result of its rapid economic growth.99 China also has
the largest number of vessels fishing on the high seas100 and is one of
the countries spending the most on subsidies for high seas fishing.101
A second form of displacement might involve fishing vessels, rather
than fish. Vessels flying the flag of the jurisdiction implementing the
ban might seek to re-flag with another country that still allows high
seas fishing. If the new flag state is more lenient than the banning
country, prior to implementing the ban, in enforcing RFMO regula-
tions, then the vessel displacement could have deleterious conse-
quences for high seas fish. The new flag state might not only allow the
vessels to fish on the high seas but also be less punctilious than the
original flag state in enforcing RMFO regulations like catch, gear, and
area restrictions. Vessel migration to laxer flag states might then fur-
ther undermine the effectiveness of RFMO regulations. However, the
need for subsidies to make high seas fishing economical might limit
vessels from re-flagging with laxer flag states. If high seas fishing is
unprofitable absent government subsidies, then vessels wanting to
continue high seas fishing would be limited to re-flagging with coun-
tries willing to subsidize vessels that had not previously flown their
flags.
Although fish and vessel displacement may erode some of the envi-
ronmental benefits, there still may be a case for acting unilaterally.
Unilateral action by a major seafood importer might be an initial step
toward developing a norm favoring the protection of the high seas as a
fish bank.102 There are precedents for unilateral action by the U.S.
leading to improvements in fishing behavior. U.S. unilateral action in
the 1980s and 1990s preceded the development of international re-
gimes that reduced dolphin mortality from tuna fishing in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific Ocean.103
99. U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 27, at 54.
100. Sala et al., supra note 2, at 1.
101. Id. at 3.
102. Green & Rudyk, supra note 18.
103. Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the
Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999) (The history of U.S. efforts to regulate tuna fishing
in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean “demonstrates how trade leverage can mobilize
discourse, contribute to learning, empower creation of a regime, and shape percep-
tions of legitimacy.”); Jennifer Ramach, Note, Dolphin-safe Tuna Labelling: Are the
Dolphins Finally Safe?, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 743, 756 (1996). For other examples where
U.S. threats of import prohibitions prompted changes in fishing behavior by other
countries, see Taylor, supra note 25, at 145.
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2. Enforcement
Another concern is whether a single jurisdiction could actually ex-
clude all high seas fish from its domestic market. Keeping out fish
caught on the high seas would require knowing where fish was caught,
and in particular, knowing that it was not caught on the high seas. This
information is not easy to determine, however. The supply chain for
seafood is complex. Fish may be caught on the high seas, trans-
shipped—meaning transferred—at sea, landed at port, exported to an-
other jurisdiction for processing, and then exported to another
country for sale to end-consumers.104 Along the way, there are many
opportunities to commingle fish caught from one vessel with fish
caught by others: a ship receiving fish at sea might be receiving fish
from several vessels, and so might a processor.
The complexity of the supply chain has made it possible for fish
caught illegally—in contravention of RFMO and national fishing reg-
ulations—to be exported to countries around the world. Perhaps “one
in three” of the fish traded internationally could have been caught in
IUU fishing.105 “[I]llegal and unreported catches represented 20–32%
by weight of wild-caught seafood imported to the USA in 2011.”106
The precedents for a ban on high seas fish described above are in-
tended to reduce IUU fishing by curtailing access to U.S. and EU
markets for fish that is illegally caught in violation of RFMO and na-
tional regulations. The U.S. SIMP, the EU catch certification scheme,
and the tuna and toothfish catch documentation schemes are espe-
cially relevant because they require that fish arriving at a nation’s bor-
ders come with documentation about where it was caught, which is
exactly the information that would be needed to enforce a ban on high
seas fish imports. There are indications that the tuna and toothfish
schemes have succeeded in curtailing IUU fishing, even if there are
doubts about the effectiveness of the EU catch certification scheme.107
A ban on high seas fishing might be easier to implement than the
variety of international fisheries regulations that the U.S., the EU, and
other countries are currently struggling to enforce. These existing reg-
104. See, e.g., Alfa Int’l Seafood v. Ross, 264 F. Supp. 3d 23, 30 (D.D.C. 2017);
HOSCH, supra note 40, at 12.
105. HOSCH, supra note 40, at 3.
106. Ganapathiraju Pramod et al., Estimates of Illegal and Unreported Seafood Im-
ported Into the USA, 48 MARINE POL’Y 102, 102 (2014).
107. Hosch insightfully analyzes the impacts of the CCAMLR, ICCAT, CCSBT
and EU catch documentation schemes. HOSCH, supra note 40, at 18–26, 28–31. Hosch
refers to anecdotal evidence of a “price premium” for certified toothfish, and a price
penalty for illegally caught tuna that cannot be certified; this evidence is consistent
with the tuna and toothfish catch documentation schemes deterring IUU fishing. Id.
at 23. He also argues that the implementation of the tuna catch documentation
schemes is correlated with “the beginning of stock recovery, which suggests the mea-
sures could be contributing to improved stock protection.” Id. at 22–23. For a recent
analysis of the impacts of the EU’s catch certification scheme and carding regime, see
ENVTL. JUSTICE FOUND. ET AL., supra note 87.
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ulations permit fishing on the high seas subject to various limitations
such as overall catch limits and restrictions on when, where, and how
fish are taken.108 An outright ban would require verifying only the
location of the harvest, not when the fish was caught or what kind of
gear was used. The key to effectively implementing a ban would be
the ability to know, for every shipment of fish that might have come
from the high seas, where the fish were caught with a high degree of
confidence, so as to be able to exclude fish caught on the high seas.
Because few fish are caught exclusively on the high seas, only 1–3% of
fish species, the species of the fish could not be used as a proxy for
high seas fish.109 However, it might be the case that certain species of
fish are more likely to be caught on the high seas than in EEZs. If this
is true, then the species type might be used as a basis for selectively
auditing the information about the origins of the fish. As in the U.S.
SIMP and the EU catch certification scheme, a jurisdiction imposing a
ban likely would not verify the accuracy of information provided
about the origin of every shipment of fish entering the country but
rather selectively audit the information based on the risk of inaccu-
racy—or, more specifically, the risk that the fish was caught on the
high seas.
As under the SIMP, the jurisdiction could require importers to ob-
tain and retain information about the location where fish was har-
vested. This would put the burden on importers to know the origins of
their product, just as the SIMP does. Alternatively, similar to the EU
catch certification scheme and the toothfish and tuna catch documen-
tation schemes, importers could be required to provide a harvest loca-
tion certificate validated by the harvesting vessel’s flag state. This
approach puts the major burden on the flag state; the importer is
merely a conduit for the information about harvest location.
Regardless of whether importers or flag states have the burden of
validating the harvest location, the burdened entity must be able to
verify the information. Under the toothfish catch documentation
scheme discussed earlier, the ability to verify the location of the catch
ultimately derives from requiring all vessels fishing in the Convention
on Antarctic Marine Living Resources area to have satellite-based
Vessel Monitoring Systems (“VMS”) relaying in “real-time” their lo-
cations to their flag state and/or CCAMLR.110 VMS units send infor-
108. See, e.g., COMM’N FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING
RES., BROWSE CONSERVATION MEASURES, https://www.ccamlr.org/en/conservation-
and-management/browse-conservation-measures [https://perma.cc/58RH-6HQM].
109. See GLOBAL OCEAN COMM’N, supra note 3, at 75; ROGERS ET AL., supra note
2, at 13. Schiller et al. “found that only one species, Antarctic toothfish, is caught on
the high seas and nowhere else” Schiller et al., supra note 2, at 2. R
110. For U.S. requirements that vessels fishing in CCAMLR have VMS, see 50
C.F.R. § 300.219 (2017). The U.S. appears to require that all vessels that it licenses to
fish on the high seas have some kind of VMS that reports at least hourly on the
vessel’s location to NOAA’s Office of Law Enforcement. 50 C.F.R. § 300.337(d). For
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mation to a satellite that can be used to determine vessel location,
speed, and direction. VMS is useful for identifying whether a vessel is
fishing in an area closed to fishing—as the high seas would be under a
ban—because the pattern of communications from the vessel can be
used to determine if the vessel is stationed, and thus likely fishing, in
an area or merely transiting through it.111 So, if all vessels that could
fish on the high seas had VMS, then their harvesting locations could
be tracked and known. Small fishing vessels participating in near-
shore fisheries would not be need to be equipped with VMS because
they would not be able to harvest fish on the high seas.
It is not currently clear how prevalent VMS use is worldwide. How-
ever, VMS is an important component of U.S. fisheries management.
The U.S. claims to have “the largest national VMS fleet in the world,”
monitoring over 4,000 fishing vessels using VMS.112 The U.S. uses
VMS to monitor U.S. vessels fishing in the U.S. EEZ;113 in addition,
all U.S.-flagged vessels permitted to fish on the high seas are required
to have VMS.114
VMS might become the norm among large fishing vessels world-
wide. Installing VMS on fishing vessels might initially be costly, but
once VMS is operating it seems reasonably cheap to maintain and use
to track vessels.115 In 2015, NMFS estimated that it costs “[u]p to
$3,100” to purchase a VMS unit for a vessel and $50–$400 to install.116
However, another source suggests that a VMS unit might cost less
CCAMLR’s requirements that vessels have VMS, see COMM’N FOR THE CONSERVA-
TION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RES., CONSERVATION MEASURE 10-04, AUTO-
MATED SATELLITE-LINKED VESSEL MONITORING SYSTEMS (VMS) (2015), at paras. 2,
11–12.
111. NAT. RES. DEFENSE COUNCIL & CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON,
LLP, THE MAGNUSON STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT:
LESSONS FROM U.S. FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 33-26 (Mar. 2016) [hereinafter NRDC
& CLEARY]; In the Matter of Jason Robinson, SW 1002974, *9 (NOAA 2013) (cited in
NRDC & CLEARY, supra, at 33).
112. NOAA Law Enforcement, NOAA FISHERIES (June 19, 2017), http://www.nmfs
.noaa.gov/ole/about/our_programs/vessel_monitoring.html [https://perma.cc/EB4G-
DPME]. According to NOAA, over twenty-two fisheries in which U.S. vessels partici-
pate (domestic and high seas) use VMS. VMS Program Codifies Requirements,
Prepares for Larger Vessel Monitoring Workload, NOAA FISHERIES (June 3, 2015),
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/slider_stories/2015/3june15_vms_program_codifies_re
quirements.html [https://perma.cc/KRF4-KLY3]. For information on the U.S. VMS
program, see also PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 43, at 7.
113. Enforcement, NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/about/our_pro
grams/vessel_monitoring.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T6G9-X6
6E]; In the Matter of Jason Robinson, SW 1002974, *6 (NOAA 2013) (Pacific
groundfish fishery).
114. NOAA Permitting and Monitoring of U.S. High Seas Fishing Vessels, 80 Fed.
Reg. 62,488, 62,492 (Oct. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 300 (2017)) [herein-
after NOAA 2015 Final Rule].
115. NRDC & CLEARY, supra note 111, at 26.
116. NOAA 2015 Final Rule, supra note 114, at 62,492.
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than $1,000.117 The cost of sending reports from a VMS is small—
$0.06 per report—as is the cost of maintaining the VMS—$50–$100
annually.118 NMFS estimated that in subsequent years, after the VMS
is installed, the VMS would cost a vessel $625 per year.119 The entity
monitoring the VMS data—the flag state, for example—will also face
costs, such as the cost of receiving the data and the costs of paying
people to review it.120 A country banning the import of high seas fish
might subsidize the other countries’ VMS costs.121 The question is
how would an exporting country value the cost of installing VMS on
its fishing vessels to ensure continued access to the market of the
country banning the import of high seas fish, relative to giving up that
market for its products and diverting them to states with more lenient
regulations.
There also are other newer technologies available to track the loca-
tion of fishing vessels worldwide, and technology could further evolve
to reduce the cost of identifying the location of fish catches.122 Auto-
matic ship identification systems (“AISs”) provide “publicly accessi-
ble” data “about a ship’s identity, position, and course,”123 while VMS
systems generally are “closed-access.”124 AIS was originally developed
to prevent ships from getting into accidents; and as with VMS, a ship
has a device onboard that relays information to a satellite about its
location. In contrast to VMS, however, AIS sends continuous signals,
enabling regulators enforcing fisheries regulations to know with
greater precision the location of a vessel at all times. McCauley et al.
argue that if fishing vessels were required to have transponders, satel-
117. BRETT WIEDOFF, PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, VESSEL MOVEMENT MONI-
TORING – SCOPING AND STRAWMEN ALTERNATIVES 11 (2015), http://www.pcouncil
.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/I1_SupStaffPPTOverview_Wiedoff_APR2015BB
.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6RF-LFQB].
118. NOAA 2015 Final Rule, supra note 114, at 62,492–93.
119. Id.
120. NRDC & CLEARY, supra note 111, at 33.
121. VMS Program Codified Requirements, Prepares for Larger Vessel Monitoring
Workload, NOAA FISHERIES (June 3, 2015), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/
slider_stories/2015/3june15_vms_program_codifies_requirements.html [https://perma
.cc/BG49-UF34] (explaining that when NMFS mandated that all U.S.-flagged high
seas vessels install VMS, it reimbursed part of the cost that vessels incurred in
purchasing VMS); NOAA 2015 Final Rule, supra note 114, at 62,489.
122. See, e.g., Mallory Pickett, Is Mass Surveillance the Future of Conservation?,
SLATE (Sept. 17, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/09/overfishing-surveillance-
birds-cameras-drones.html [https://perma.cc/A4U5-YMF8].
123. Douglas J. McCauley et al., Ending Hide and Seek at Sea, 351 SCI. 1,148, 1,148
(2016).
124. Id. Indonesia is “the only flag state that publicly provides VMS data.” Sala et
al., supra note 2, at 5. Indonesia has shared its VMS data with a Google-designed
platform, Global Fishing Watch; the data sharing is making it much easier for the
country to monitor ocean fishing. Google Is Indonesia’s New Weapon in War on Ille-
gal Fishing, THE GULF TIME: EMIRATES BUS. (Apr. 22, 2018), http://emirates-busi-
ness.ae/google-is-indonesias-new-weapon-in-war-on-illegal-fishing/ [https://perma.cc/
3XT6-8UMU].
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lites would make it “possible to use AIS to observe vessel activity any-
where.”125 Currently, only a small number of fishing vessels
worldwide are equipped with such units.126 Because AIS information
is public, it can be used by NGOs to help states enforce fishing regula-
tions, including prohibitions on fishing in protected areas of the
oceans.127 For example, the Pew Charitable Trusts have funded the
development of Project Eyes on the Seas, which uses AIS and other
data for this purpose.128 Eyes on the Seas will be used to help the
country of Palau prevent fishing within its marine sanctuary.129
There also are older methods of enforcing fishing regulations that
might be used to verify the location of fish catches including requiring
the presence of human observers on fishing vessels and vessel trip re-
ports.130 However, it can be expensive to place human observers on
fishing vessels, and trip reports need to be validated, presumably by
VMS.131
As mentioned above, a ban on the importation of high seas fish
likely would be accompanied by the banning jurisdiction prohibiting
its fishing vessels from fishing on the high seas. It would be adminis-
tratively straightforward for the U.S. to prohibit its vessels from fish-
ing on the high seas, although perhaps not politically easy. The U.S.
requires that vessels have a special permit to fish on the high seas, and
there currently are 467 U.S.-flagged vessels permitted to do so.132
125. McCauley et al., supra note 123, at 1,148. R
126. Id. at 1,148–49.
127. Id. at 1,148.
128. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PROJECT EYES ON THE SEAS 1 (2015), http://www
.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/03/eyes-on-the-seas-brief_web.pdf [https://perma
.cc/MT8K-K6VR].
129. PEW Unveils Pioneering Technology to Help End Illegal Fishing, PEW CHARI-
TABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-
releases/2015/01/21/pew-unveils-pioneering-technology-to-help-end-illegal-fishing
[https://perma.cc/D468-UM38]. A recent research paper uses AIS data from fishing
vessels to determine the spatial impact of fishing on the oceans, concluding that “73%
of the ocean was fished in 2016.” David A. Kroodsma et al., Tracking the Global
Footprint for Fisheries, 359 SCI. 904, 905 (2018). It mentions that “AIS captures the
majority of fishing effort in the high seas.” Id.
NOAA also has “new Boat Detection products” that use satellite data to detect
“vessels that are lit or use lights, including fishing vessels using lights to attract fish.”
NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15, at 59. These apparently “can detect human activity
in marine protected areas.” Id.
130. See NRDC & CLEARY, supra note 111, at 7–8.
131. Id. at 34; NOAA 2015 Final Rule, supra note 114, at 62,493. NMFS reports
that “[m]ost high seas fishing vessels are already subject to requirements for carrying
an observer.” Id.
132. Turner, supra note 50; 50 C.F.R. § 300.333(b) (2017); NOAA 2015 Final Rule,
supra note 114, at 62,492. These permits last for five years, and the U.S. can revoke
them on certain grounds. 50 C.F.R. § 300.333. It is difficult to bring a successful tak-
ings claim for the revocation of a fishing permit. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v.
United States, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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3. Legal Risks
Banning the importation of fish caught on the high seas would be a
major departure from existing U.S. policy. The U.S. has attempted to
improve the status of high seas fisheries by strengthening the RFMOs
and invested significant efforts in improving their capacity and opera-
tions. The SIMP is one example of these efforts, as it is intended to
help enforce RFMO fisheries regulations. Because of the executive
branch’s and Congress’s commitment to strengthening RFMOs, Con-
gressional legislation may be necessary to ban the import of high seas
fish and prohibit U.S.-flagged vessels from high seas fishing.133 A care-
ful review would be necessary of NFMS’s authority under existing leg-
islation to determine if the agency could by regulation ban high seas
fishing by U.S.-flagged vessels, and the import of some or all fish
caught on the high seas, or if Congressional legislation would be
necessary.
In addition to requiring statutory authorization, any ban must also
conform with WTO law. Past U.S. efforts to unilaterally alter fishing
practices by foreign vessels to protect sea turtles and dolphins have
given rise to celebrated WTO cases.134 According to Robert Howse, a
prominent international trade law scholar, the WTO Appellate Body
has generally interpreted the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(“TBT”) so as to provide nation states with considerable scope to ad-
dress environmental issues.135 Howse highlights the Appellate Body’s
approach to the shrimp-turtle dispute as an important turning point in
WTO jurisprudence toward affirming the ability of nation states to use
trade measures to protect the environment.136 The Appellate Body
eventually upheld a U.S. import ban to protect endangered sea turtles
from shrimp fishing.137 However, before doing so, the Appellate Body
held that the ban was inconsistent with the chapeau to Article XX of
GATT because the U.S. had discriminated between countries in im-
plementing the ban.138 The ultimate decision to uphold the import ban
133. For evidence of NOAA’s commitments to strengthening the RFMOs, see
NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 15. For evidence of Congress’s commitment, see 16
U.S.C. § 1826i (2012) (directing “[t]he Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of
State” to “take actions to improve the effectiveness of international fishery manage-
ment organizations”).
134. For a recent decision upholding the latest version of the U.S. rules governing
the use of dolphin-safe labelling, see Tuna-Dolphin Panels, supra note 57.
135. Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years on: Global Govern-
ance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2016).
136. Id. at 36–42; Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 30; Appellate Body, United States –
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5
of the DSU by Malaysia, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter
Shrimp-Turtle II].
137. Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 136.
138. Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 30, paras. 149–50, at 56–57.
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in Shrimp-Turtle bodes well for the ability of the U.S. to impose im-
port prohibitions to protect some or all high seas fisheries.139
Nonetheless, Shrimp-Turtle and subsequent case law emphasizes
that the U.S. would need to be careful in designing and implementing
trade measures to avoid differentially treating fisheries in ways that
could not be rationally justified given the objective of protecting high
seas fisheries.140 Howse explains that the Appellate Body strictly scru-
tinizes for discrimination impugned national regulations in determin-
ing whether they comply with the chapeau to Article XX, and the
equivalent requirement for a “legitimate regulatory distinction” that
the Appellate Body “has read into” Article 2.1 of the TBT.141 The
Appellate Body has found national regulatory schemes to be discrimi-
natory because they are under-inclusive given national objectives.142
For example, the U.S. regulates the use of the dolphin-safe label on
tuna to protect dolphins from being killed or hurt by tuna fishers.143 In
Tuna Dolphin II, the Appellate Body found the U.S. regulatory re-
gime of the dolphin-safe label violated Article 2.1 of the TBT Agree-
ment because tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean using
purse seine vessels had to meet stringent requirements to be labeled
dolphin-safe, while tuna caught elsewhere using other fishing methods
139. Others have also concluded that a ban on the import of all or some high seas
fish could be implemented consistent with WTO law. Green & Rudyk indicate that a
“High Seas Ban Club” could be implemented in compliance with international trade
law. Green & Rudyk, supra note 18, at 6 (“Any ban on imports is a prima facie viola-
tion of WTO rules on limits on quantitative restrictions, but could reasonably be al-
lowed through the general exception ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources’ in Article XX of the GATT. Such an exception would require dem-
onstrating that the proposed fish trading club was not a disguised restriction on trade
and a tailored response to the problem of IUU fishing on the high seas.”). In 2010,
Taylor concluded that the U.S. could use the Pelly Amendment and the Magnuson–
Stevens Act to implement WTO-compliant prohibitions on the importation of fish
and other products from countries that allow their flagged-vessels to bottom trawl on
the high seas. Taylor, supra note 25, at 168.
140. To be clear, there are a host of provisions in WTO law that the U.S. would
need to be mindful of in designing and implementing an import ban on high seas fish.
This Essay focuses on the risk of the ban being deemed discriminatory because of the
prominence of concerns about discrimination in the Appellate Body case law in two
disputes in which the U.S. was called upon to defend environmental measures, Tuna-
Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle.
141. Howse, supra note 135, at 46, id. at 51–53.
142. Id. at 52.
143. See, e.g., Appellate Body, United States – Measures Concerning the Importa-
tion, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, paras. 20, 302, WTO Doc. WT/
DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin II]. In the second compliance
proceeding following Tuna-Dolphin II, the Panels recognized that while the U.S.
dolphin-safe labelling is often described as having two objectives (protecting dolphins
and avoiding consumers being deceived about whether the tuna they are buying was
harvested in a way that harmed dolphins), the regime can be understood as having the
single objective of protecting dolphins by disseminating information to consumers
about the dolphin-friendliness of the method through which the tuna was caught.
Tuna-Dolphin Panels, supra note 57, at para. 7.705.
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generally did not.144 The Appellate Body acknowledged that the risks
to dolphins from tuna fishing might be greater in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific Ocean than elsewhere. However, recognizing that other fishing
methods used elsewhere also posed risks to dolphins, the Appellate
Body insisted that additional requirements for the dolphin-safe label
must be placed upon these other fisheries as well for the labeling re-
quirements to be non-discriminatory and to be consistent with Article
2.1 of the TBT.145 After this decision, the U.S. revised its dolphin-safe
labeling regime in an effort to make it consistent with WTO law.
Nonetheless, in the first compliance proceeding on whether the U.S.
changes were sufficient, the Appellate Body held that the amended
labeling regime violated Article 2.1 of the TBT and the chapeau of
Article XX of GATT 1994 because it was under-inclusive. The Appel-
late Body identified scenarios where tuna caught outside the Eastern
Tropical Pacific Ocean would qualify more easily for the dolphin-safe
label, despite the fact that dolphins faced similar risks from tuna fish-
ing inside and outside the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean large purse
seine fishery.146 The U.S. once again amended its labeling regime after
this decision. In the fall of 2017, WTO panels held that the U.S. had
finally succeeded in crafting a regime that is WTO compliant.147 Mex-
ico appealed to the Appellate Body, and as of this writing, its decision
has not yet been released.148
144. Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 143, at paras. 297–98. There were some limits on
the use of the dolphin-safe label for tuna caught outside the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean. To be labelled dolphin-safe, tuna caught outside the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean using purse seine vessels had “to provide a certification by the captain that no
purse seine net was intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins during the
fishing trip.” Id. at para. 292. (In contrast, tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean using purse seine vessels had to get certifications from the captain and an inde-
pendent observer “that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets in
which the tuna were caught and that no purse seine net was intentionally deployed on
or used to encircle dolphins during the same fishing trip.” Id. at para. 176 (excerpting
Panel decision) (italics and underlining omitted)). Also, “tuna caught using driftnets
on the high seas” could not be labelled dolphin-safe (whereas tuna caught within
EEZs using driftnets could be labelled dolphin-safe). Id. at para. 270.
145. Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 143, at para. 297–98. The Appellate Body did not
insist that tuna caught outside the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean had to meet the
same requirements as the tuna caught there to be labelled dolphin-safe. Id. at para.
296.
146. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by Mexico, paras. 7.265–.266, WTO Doc. WT.DS381/AB/RW (adopted Dec. 3, 2015)
(the determination, tracking and verification requirements are under-inclusive, and so
the differential regulatory treatment of different fisheries is not due to a legitimate
regulatory distinction); id. at paras. 7.355–.360 (same requirements mean that the U.S.
“has not demonstrated” that there is no “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX”).
147. Tuna-Dolphin Panels, supra note 57, at paras. 7.717, 7.739.
148. Vicki Needham, US Wins Trade Case Over ‘Dolphin Safe’ Tuna Labeling, THE
HILL (Oct. 26, 2017, 7:28 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/357437-us-wins-trade-
case-over-dolphin-safe-tuna-labeling [https://perma.cc/29L4-L3U2]; WORLD TRADE
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The Tuna-Dolphin saga is worth keeping in mind when contemplat-
ing an outright—and especially for a partial—import ban to protect
high seas fisheries. Politically, a partial import ban, such as an import
ban on fish that are caught through bottom trawling on the high seas,
might be an attractive option because it might be possible to construct
a partial ban that does not burden American fishers. For example, an
import ban on bottom-trawled high seas fish would not harm U.S.
fishers because U.S.-flagged vessels do not bottom trawl on the high
seas, although there is bottom trawling in the U.S. EEZ.149 Part of the
backdrop to Tuna-Dolphin II was that the U.S. dolphin-safe regula-
tions did not really burden U.S.-flagged tuna vessels because few U.S.-
flagged vessels were catching tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean using purse seine vessels by the mid-1990s.150 The burden of
the labeling requirements fell on Mexican tuna harvesters who were
still catching tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean using purse
seine vessels; thus, Mexico was the complainant in Tuna-Dolphin II.151
An import ban on bottom-trawled high seas fish might be challenged
as under-inclusive, just as the labeling regulations were in Tuna-
Dolphin II, because the U.S. allows bottom trawling in its own EEZ,
although it has taken steps to curtail the practice.152 Such a ban might
ORG., UNITED STATES – MEASURES CONCERNING THE IMPORTATION, MARKETING
AND SALE OF TUNA AND TUNA PRODUCTS (2018), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm [https://perma.cc/GZL9-WG3R].
149. Taylor, supra note 25, at 164 (“American vessels do not engage in bottom
trawling on high seas seamounts anywhere in the world.”). Not many vessels bottom
trawl on the high seas, and the vessels that do are flagged to a small number of devel-
oped countries. According to a 2008 report by the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion, “in 2006, approximately 285 vessels were involved in high seas bottom fisheries.”
U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., DEEP-SEA FISHERIES IN THE HIGH SEAS 3 (2009), http://
www.fao.org/docrep/014/i1064e/i1064e00.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8W8-ZZ3B] [herein-
after DEEP-SEA FISHERIES IN THE HIGH SEAS]. “The majority of vessels currently
authorized to bottom fish on the high seas are flagged to a relatively small number of
States, including several EU Member States (e.g., Spain and Portugal); New Zealand;
Japan; Russian Federation; South Korea; Australia; and the Cook Islands.” GIANNI ET
AL., supra note 34, at 6. See also GIANNI, supra note 25, at viii (“Fishing vessels flag-
ged to only 11 countries – Spain, Russia, Portugal, Norway, Estonia, Denmark/Faros
Islands, Japan, Lithuania, Iceland, New Zealand and Latvia, took approximately 95%
of the reported high seas bottom trawl catch in 2001. . . . European Union countries
(including Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia but excluding the Faroe Islands) took ap-
proximately 60% of the high seas bottom trawl catch in 2001. Spain accounted for
approximately two-thirds of the European Union catch and some 40% of the overall
global high seas bottom trawl catch.”).
150. Parker, supra note 103, at 29, 38–39; Ramach, supra note 103, at 751. See also
Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 143, at paras. 206, 234. The U.S. had started regulating its
own tuna fishing vessels to protect dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean
much earlier, in the 1970s. Parker, supra note 103, at 18–19.
151. Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 143, at paras. 206, 234.
152. See, e.g., DEEP SEA CONSERVATION COALITION, MOMENTUM IN SUPPORT OF A
MORATORIUM ON HIGH SEAS BOTTOM TRAWLING CONTINUES TO GROW 1–2 (2006),
http://www.savethehighseas.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/06/Political_Momentum_Ad
dendum.pdf [https://perma.cc/X32S-9KK9]; THOMAS F. HOURIGAN ET AL., NAT’L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE STATE OF DEEP-SEA CORAL AND SPONGE
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL111.txt unknown Seq: 31 14-DEC-18 14:40
2018] UNILATERAL STEPS TO END HIGH SEAS FISHING 289
be considered under-inclusive if the U.S. objective is defined as pro-
tecting marine biodiversity because eliminating bottom trawling on
both the high seas and EEZs would more comprehensively protect
marine biodiversity than a ban on bottom trawling on the high seas
alone. On the one hand, the objective behind restricting the import of
bottom-trawled high seas fish could be defined as protecting marine
biodiversity on the high seas specifically.153 The international commu-
nity has sought to protect deep sea areas on the high seas, in particu-
lar, from bottom trawling since the early 2000s through a series of UN
General Assembly resolutions because of the environmental charac-
teristics and the limited governance of the deep sea within the high
seas.154 Thus, an import ban on bottom-trawled high seas fish might be
defensible because of the biodiversity, the history of international ef-
forts to protect that biodiversity, and the absence of bottom trawling
by U.S.-flagged vessels.
ECOSYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES vi, 95 (2017), https://deepseacoraldata.noaa.gov/
library/2015-state-of-dsc-report-folder/NOAA_State-of-DSC-Ecosystems_2017_
OHC-TM04.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NJS-J3BU]. Some well-known examples of U.S.
measures to protect deep sea ecosystems in its EEZ are President Obama’s designa-
tion of the Northeast Canyons and Seamounts Marine National Monument in the
Atlantic and in the Pacific, his expansion of the Papahaˆnaumokuaˆkea and Pacific Re-
mote Islands Marine National Monuments. Interior Secretary Zinke has recom-
mended allowing fishing within the Northeast Canyons and Seamounts, Pacific
Remote Islands, and the Rose Atoll (also in the Pacific) marine monuments and
changing the boundaries of the Pacific Remote Islands and Rose Atoll monuments.
RYAN K. ZINKE, SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FINAL REVIEW
OF DESIGNATIONS UNDER THE ANTIQUITIES ACT, MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESI-
DENT 15, 16–18 (2017), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/12/05/document_pm_01
.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR4W-2U6S].
153. Under Appellate Body jurisprudence, adjudicators may reject a nation state’s
framing of its objective and reframe the objective of the nation state’s regulation.
Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 143, at para. 303.
154. There are deep sea areas within EEZs and the high seas. See DEEP-SEA FISH-
ERIES IN THE HIGH SEAS, supra note 149, at 2, http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i1064e/
i1064e00.pdf [https://perma.cc/5285-R8SB]; GIANNI, supra note 25, at 2. Deep sea ar-
eas are rich in biodiversity, and feature seamounts and corals. GIANNI ET AL., supra
note 34, at 3 (“The report of the UNGA’s First Global Integrated Marine Assess-
ment, published in 2015, states that the deep-sea constitutes the largest source of spe-
cies and ecosystem diversity on Earth.”) (citing JEROEN INGELS ET AL., FIRST
GLOBAL INTEGRATED MARINE ASSESSMENT Ch. 36F, 1 (2016)).
On the distinct governance challenges for protecting the deep sea on the high seas,
see DEEP-SEA FISHERIES IN THE HIGH SEAS, supra note 149, at 7 (“Deep-sea fisheries
in the high seas are not only unique because of the nature of the resources fishers
exploit and the potential vulnerability of some of the ecosystems in which they occur.
There are governance challenges specific to managing fisheries in areas beyond na-
tional jurisdiction.”); see also GIANNI ET AL., supra note 34, at 74 (detailing the history
of UN General Assembly resolutions).
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IV. WHY THE UNITED STATES MIGHT ACT UNILATERALLY
TO END HIGH SEAS FISHING
A country that bans the import of high seas fish to protect these
fisheries would be a conferring a positive externality on other coun-
tries. Moreover, as discussed above, there is no guarantee that one
country’s actions to protect high seas fish would not be undermined by
the actions of other countries’ fishing vessels. The other countries’
fishing vessels could harvest and sell the fish that the banning jurisdic-
tion’s vessels would otherwise have taken. So, is there any reason to
think that the U.S. might take it upon itself to unilaterally ban the
importation of fish caught on the high seas?
As the precedents outlined in Section II(B) suggest, the U.S. and
the EU have already taken measures intended to protect high seas fish
that impose costs, without any guarantee of a corresponding benefit to
the U.S. and the EU. The high seas fisheries may not benefit either
because other importing countries may continue to disregard RFMO
and national regulations. Measures such as the SIMP, the Shrimp Tur-
tle Law, and the dolphin-safe tuna labeling regime suggest that there
might be some circumstances under which the U.S. might ban high
seas fish imports in the future.
Three conditions are likely conducive to the U.S. taking unilateral
action to protect high seas fisheries. The first condition is clear evi-
dence of the harms of high seas fishing that resonates with the U.S.
public and elected officials. The U.S. began regulating tuna fishing to
protect dolphins starting in the 1970s, after evidence emerged in the
late 1960s of tuna vessels harming dolphins in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific Ocean.155 Initially, the U.S. focused on regulating tuna fishing
by U.S.-flagged vessels in the area; the U.S. fleet then re-flagged or
migrated to fishing in the Western Pacific Ocean—where dolphins and
tunas do not travel together and so tuna fishing is less likely to harm
dolphins. In the late 1980s, the U.S. began focusing on regulating tuna
fishing by foreign-flagged vessels harming dolphins.156 Vivid images in
the 1980s of tuna fishers harming dolphins provided an impetus for
U.S. regulation of foreign tuna fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean.157
No high seas fish is as charismatic as dolphins. However, the terrible
working conditions of fishing crews on the high seas might generate
155. Parker, supra note 103, at 17; Ramach, supra note 103, at 747.
156. Parker, supra note 103, at 18–19, 29–30, 38.
157. Id. at 11–12 (describing video of “dolphins dying in fishing nets designed to
catch the tuna that swam beneath” played before Senate Committee in 1988 in the
lead up to “the 1988 Marine Mammal Protection Act”); Denis A. O’Connell, Tuna,
Dolphins, and Purse Seine Fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific: The Controversy
Continues, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 77, 78 (2005) (describing the video as “the
catalyst for a shifting debate regarding dolphins and the [Eastern Tropical Pacific]
purse seine tuna fishing industry”); Ramach, supra note 103, at 751–52 (1988 video).
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public outrage. In 2015, the New York Times published a series of six
articles on “lawlessness on the high seas.”158 The series emphasizes
that high seas fishing is not only environmentally destructive but also
entails massive violations of human rights because fishing crews are
sexually and physically abused, denied pay, and killed.159 Recently,
the Monterey Bay Aquarium introduced a “Seafood Slavery Risk
Tool” “to help corporate seafood buyers assess the risk of forced la-
bor, human trafficking and hazardous child labor in the seafood they
purchase.”160 These developments suggest that public concern with
the use of slavery in fishing is building and that environmentalists may
be able to ally with labor and human rights activists to campaign
against high seas fishing. However, environmentalists work in differ-
ent fora from labor and human rights activists and alliances might be
hard to form.161
A second condition that might prompt the U.S. to take unilateral
action is concerted pressure from the U.S. environmental community
to protect high seas fish. Environmental and animal rights groups
played a role in lobbying for legislative changes to bolster U.S. regula-
tion of foreign tuna fleets to protect dolphins, organizing boycotts of
tuna caught through setting on dolphins, and pushing and defending
standards governing the use of dolphin-safe labels on canned tuna.162
It appears that environmental groups that take an interest in high
seas fishing are still focusing on protecting the high seas through
RFMOs and the BBNJ process at the UN. If these groups grow suffi-
ciently frustrated with the BBNJ process and the RFMOs, they may
switch to favoring an outright ban on high seas fishing. The Pew-
158. See, e.g., Ian Urbina, A Renegade Trawler, Hunted for 10,000 Miles by Vigilan-
tes, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/world/a-renegade-
trawler-hunted-for-10000-miles-by-vigilantes.html [https://perma.cc/6TC4-J2L3].
159. See e.g., Ian Urbina, ‘Sea Slaves’: The Human Misery That Feeds Pets and Live-
stock, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2015), http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/world/outlaw-
ocean-thailand-fishing-sea-slaves-pets.html?referer=http://www.nytimes.com/interac
tive/2015/07/12/world/100000003785574.embedded.html [https://perma.cc/MZ3M-LP
M3]; Ian Urbina, Tricked and Indebted on Land, Abused or Abandoned at Sea, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/world/asia/philippines-fish-
ing-ships-illegal-manning-agencies.html [https://perma.cc/R6U8-HGAA].
Relatedly, the Associated Press won a Pulitzer Prize in 2016 for an investigation
into the use of slavery in fisheries—mainly EEZ fisheries—in Southeast Asia. An AP
Investigation Helps Free Slaves in the 21st Century, ASSOCIATED PRESS, https://www
.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/ [https://perma.cc/R7J2-EUUS].
160. Clare Leschin-Hoar, Was Your Seafood Caught With Slave Labor? New
Database Helps Retailers Combat Abuse, NPR (Feb. 1, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://www
.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2018/02/01/582214032/was-your-seafood-caught-with-slave-la
bor-new-database-helps-retailers-combat-abu [https://perma.cc/4QPC-X8BR].
161. Human rights violations in the high seas fishing industry are an economic as
well as a human rights issue. Illegally low levels of compensation for workers reduces
the cost of high seas fishing, helping to transform what might otherwise be an unprof-
itable activity into a profitable one. Sala et al., supra note 2, at 7–8.
162. Parker, supra note 103, at 32–33; O’Connell, supra note 157, at 85; Ramach,
supra note 103, at 753, 765, 768.
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funded Global Ocean Commission report from 2014 argued that if en-
vironmental conditions in the oceans continue to decline, then the
high seas should be turned into a “regeneration zone”—a protected
area, where fishing would be banned—until regulatory measures were
introduced to protect them.163 Pew has been a leading funder of work
to protect the oceans; this recommendation could signal an openness
to considering the more radical option of ending high seas fishing if
existing multilateral and plurilateral processes fail.164
Even if Pew and other environmental groups were to shift to sup-
porting the end of fishing on the high seas, they still might favor pluri-
lateral and multilateral approaches because of concerns that unilateral
steps ultimately would not yield much environmental protection given
the global phenomenon of high seas fishing. There is precedent for
U.S. environmental groups favoring internationalism over unilateral-
ism in the realm of fisheries. In the 1990s, the environmental commu-
nity was split over whether U.S. law should continue to deny dolphin-
safe label use to all tuna caught through setting on dolphins in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean.165 Groups such as Greenpeace, Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, World Wildlife Fund, and the National
Wildlife Federation backed off from this position and supported the
U.S. implementing an international agreement, negotiated with Mex-
ico and other major harvesters of Eastern Tropical Pacific tuna, that
would have capped dolphin mortality but not prohibited setting on
dolphins.166 These environmental groups apparently believed that uni-
lateral U.S. action was inadequate and international action was neces-
sary to address the harms to dolphins.167 Other environmental groups,
such as Earth Island Institute, and animal rights groups insisted on
using a strict definition of dolphin-safe that would preclude the label
163. GLOBAL OCEAN COMM’N, supra note 3, at 74–76.
164. Oceans, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/topics/
oceans (last visited Aug. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/SH2T-LT6W]. An organization
like Greenpeace might be even more inclined to support ending high seas fishing than
Pew. Katarina Zimmer, How Seafood’s “Dark Web” Obscures Fraud, Fish Launder-
ing, and Slavery on the High Seas, NEW FOOD ECONOMY (Aug. 15, 2017), https://
newfoodeconomy.org/seafood-dark-web-fish-fraud-transshipment/ [https://perma.cc/
5CRA-EHNU].
165. Parker, supra note 103, at 43–46; O’Connell, supra note 157, at 88–89, 93;
Ramach, supra note 103, at 758–59, 764, 768, 772–75, 784.
166. Parker, supra note 103, at 45, 53–54.
167. Id. at 45; Ramach, supra note 103, at 772–73, 775. There were concerns in the
1990s that the U.S.’s declining share of the market for tuna from the purse seine
fishery in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean would reduce the U.S.’s ability to influ-
ence the fishing behavior of tuna fishers in the area. In the 1980s, foreign tuna fleets
had a major incentive to satisfy U.S. standards because the U.S. was “the largest
canned tuna market.” However, by 1992, the U.S. “was only [10%]” of the market for
tuna from the purse seine Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, and Europe had become
the dominant market, with Latin America developing as a market. Ramach, supra
note 103, at 750 n.51.
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from being applied to tuna caught by setting on dolphins.168 Going
forward, environmental groups might support unilateral U.S. steps to
safeguard the high seas if groups perceive these steps as progress to-
wards the plurilateral or multilateral measures necessary to more fully
protect the high seas. As mentioned, the tuna-dolphin saga supports
the notion that unilateral U.S. trade measures can lead to interna-
tional conservation efforts, as U.S. regulatory actions spurred the cre-
ation of other regimes for protecting dolphins.169
A third condition conducive to unilateral action would be a lack of
opposition to an import ban from the domestic fishing industry. Ac-
tive support from the domestic fishing industry would be even more
helpful politically.
There are some reasons for thinking that large portions of the U.S.
fishing industry might not oppose a unilateral ban on high seas fishing
by U.S.-flagged vessels and high seas fish imports. Few U.S. fishers
would suffer if the U.S. banned vessels flying its flag from fishing on
the high seas. “The U.S. EEZ is the largest in the world,”170 and most
of the U.S. catch is caught within the U.S. EEZ. Only 5.6% (by
weight) or 6.5% (by value) of the U.S. landed catch is caught in the
high seas.171 The U.S. has permitted only 467 vessels to fish on the
high seas, and the number actually fishing on the high seas appears
lower.172
Moreover, a ban might benefit the U.S. fishers that largely harvest
within the U.S. EEZ. Considering over 90% of the seafood consumed
in the U.S. is imported,173 a ban on high seas fish might increase the
demand for some of the fish harvested by vessels fishing in the U.S.
EEZ if consumers substitute domestic for imported fish. A ban also
might be attractive to the U.S. industry as a way of leveling the play-
ing field between the U.S. fishing industry and harvesters on the high
seas. The U.S. fishing industry harvesting in the U.S. EEZ is currently
168. O’Connell, supra note 157, at 88–89; Parker, supra note 103, at 46, 55.
169. Parker, supra note 103, at 9. See also Ramach, supra note 103, at 756, 784 (U.S.
regulation led to reductions in dolphin mortality in the purse seine tuna fishery in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean although setting on dolphins still continued).
170. The United States Is an Ocean Nation, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD-
MIN., http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/2011/012711_gcil_maritime_eez_map.pdf
(last visited Sept. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/58P8-HYSS].
171. Percentages are my own calculations based on commercial landings data.
DAVID VAN VOORHEES, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., FISHERIES OF THE UNITED
STATES 2015 14, 17 (Alan Lowther & Michael Liddel eds., 2016) [hereinafter NMFS]
(Commercial Landings of Fish and Shellfish by U.S. Fishing Craft: By Species, by
Distance Caught off U.S. Shores, and in International Waters, 2015) (572,819,000/
10,265,735,000 lbs., and $356,783,000/5,487,101,000).
172. Turner, supra note 50; Sala et al., supra note 2, at 2 fig.1 (reporting that less
than 200 U.S.-flagged vessels fished on the high seas according to 2016 Global Fishing
Watch data).
173. Final Regulatory Impact Review, supra note 45, at 4.
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stringently regulated under the federal Magnuson–Stevens Act;174 a
ban on fish caught on the high seas would deny access to the U.S.
market to fish historically caught under less stringent regulatory
regimes.175
Nonetheless, there is a politically powerful group of U.S. fishers
that would suffer from a ban on U.S.-flagged vessels fishing on the
high seas: tuna fishers. Tuna is by far the most important species that
U.S.-flagged vessels catch on the high seas and land in the U.S. Tuna
accounts for 98% (by weight) and 95% (by value) of the U.S. high
seas catch;176 most of the U.S. high seas tuna catch comes from the
Pacific.177 The U.S. should expect tuna fishers to oppose any effort to
ban U.S. vessels from high seas fishing, and these fishers likely have
the resources to mount an opposition campaign. Tuna fishing is highly
profitable, even without subsidies.178 Options might be devised for
compensating U.S. tuna fishers for their losses, for example by redi-
recting them to harvest in the U.S. EEZ, or by buying out their per-
mits to fish on the high seas. The U.S. has previously bought out
fishing permit holders, including during the process of establishing
protected areas. For example, the U.S. compensated the small number
of commercial fishing permit holders displaced by the creation of the
Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument in the EEZ off the
coast of Hawaii.179 While tuna fishers might not be satisfied with com-
pensation offers, they have not always prevailed in the political arena.
174. Katrina M. Wyman, The Recovery in U.S Fisheries, 31 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 149, 162 (2016).
175. For arguments for imposing more regulations on foreign-caught fish under the
SIMP to level the playing field for the domestic U.S. fishing industry, see NOAA
Proposed Rule, supra note 46, at 6,216 (“The domestic fishing community also ex-
pressed the desire for importers to be held to the same documentation standards that
apply to U.S. fisheries because they feel that they ‘already provide a staggering
amount of information and demonstrate a high degree of traceability.’”); see also id.
at 6,218; Final Regulatory Impact Review, supra note 45, at 2 (“IUU fishing in other
parts of the world can cause problems in places where there are strong rules managing
fisheries, such as the United States. . . . IUU fishers gain an unfair advantage in the
marketplace over law-abiding fishing operations as they do not pay the true cost of
sustainable production.”).
176. Percentages are my own calculations based on commercial landings data in
NMFS, supra note 171, at 14, 17 (562,704,000/572,819,000 lbs. and $338,784,000/
356,783,000). Skipjack tuna is the main type of tuna caught by U.S. vessels on the high
seas and landed in the U.S. Id. at 14.
177. Swartz et al., supra note 25, at 1,369.
178. Sala et al., supra note 2, at 3 (“We find that drifting longliners and purse sein-
ers, targeting mainly large mobile, high-value fishes such as tuna and sharks, are the
most profitable high-seas fisheries. . . . All other fisheries are either barely profitable
or unprofitable.”). Sala et al. are not referring specifically to U.S. high seas tuna fish-
eries in the Pacific.
179. Fisheries in the Western Pacific; Compensation to Federal Commercial Bot-
tomfish and Lobster Fishermen Due to Fishery Closures in the Papahanaumokuakea
Marine National Monument, Northwestern Hawaiian Islands, Final Rule, 74 Fed.
Reg. 47,119 (Sept. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 665). For analysis of other
U.S. permit and vessel buyouts, see Daniel S. Holland, Can Vessel Buybacks Pay Off:
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At the end of his presidency, President Obama expanded marine na-
tional monuments in the Pacific, despite opposition from tuna fishing
interests.180 Presumably more in line with the interests of the tuna
fishing industry, the current Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke, has
recommended that commercial fishing be allowed within two Pacific
marine national monuments.181
Because of the likely opposition from the U.S. tuna fishing fleet, a
narrower, more targeted ban that does not implicate the U.S. tuna
fishing fleet might be a more politically viable option in the U.S. An
import ban on fish that are bottom trawled on the high seas, alongside
a ban on U.S.-flagged fishing vessels bottom trawling on the high seas,
might be an especially attractive option politically. U.S.-flagged ves-
sels do not bottom trawl on the high seas; thus, a ban on high seas
bottom trawling matched by an import ban on bottom-trawled high
seas fish would not harm U.S. vessels.182 Environmentalists and others
have been seeking a moratorium on high seas bottom trawling since
the 2000s.183 The UN General Assembly has passed resolutions to cur-
tail bottom trawling on the high seas, but these resolutions have been
imperfectly implemented. The U.S. might argue that the imperfect im-
plementation, and the need to protect the high seas, justifies either an
outright import ban on bottom-trawled high seas fish or a more
An Evaluation of an Industry Funded Fishing Vessel Buyback, 82 MARINE POL’Y 8
(2017).
180. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Obama Creates the Largest Protected Place on the
Planet, in Hawaii, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/obama-to-create-the-largest-protected-place-on-the-planet-off-hawaii/2016/
08/25/54ecb632-6aec-11e6-99bf-f0cf3a6449a6_story.html?utm_term=.af5a42cc39da
[https://perma.cc/5ABH-7XRN]; Marine Reserve Expansion Shuts out Commercial
Fisheries, FISHERMAN’S NEWS (Oct. 1, 2016), http://www.fishermensnews.com/story/
2016/10/01/features/marine-reserve-expansion-shuts-out-commercial-fisheries/423
.html [https://perma.cc/8YV8-5HZ9]; Fili Sagapolutele, American Samoa Cannery
Wants Fishing Rights in Marine National Monument Restored, PAC. ISLANDS REP.
(July 12, 2017), http://www.pireport.org/articles/2017/07/12/american-samoa-cannery-
wants-fishing-rights-marine-monument-restored [https://perma.cc/5T8T-2ZC4]; Craig
Welch, Fishery Managers Seek to Gut Pacific Marine Monuments, NAT’L GEO-
GRAPHIC (Dec. 15, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/Pacific-mar
ine-monuments-fishing-Trump-environment [https://perma.cc/CT3U-ZEP5]; Ashley
Nagaoka, Commercial Fishermen Aim to Ease Fishing Restrictions at National Monu-
ment, HAW. NEWS NOW (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/349689
17/commercial-fishing-industry-hopes-trump-administration-eases-restrictions-in-
papahanaumokuakea [https://perma.cc/S9DF-BUQ4].
181. ZINKE, supra note 152, at 15–18; Laura Parker, See the Wild Places That May
Lose Protections as National Monuments, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 18, 2017), https:/
/news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/09/national-monuments-shrink-trump/ [https://per
ma.cc/GH87-YBVH]. In addition to U.S. tuna fishers, U.S. importers of high seas fish
would seem likely to oppose an import ban on fish caught on the high seas. Importers
unsuccessfully sued to block the implementation of the Seafood Import Monitoring
Program. Alfa Int’l Seafood v. Ross, 264 F. Supp. 3d 23 (D.D.C. 2017).
182. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 25, at 132–33 (285 vessels engaged in “deep-sea
bottom fishing” in 2006; the U.S. is not among the countries listed as flagging most of
these vessels).
183. Taylor, supra note 25, at 133; GIANNI ET AL., supra note 34, at 73.
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targeted import ban on high seas fish caught in specific areas that are
not being protected in accordance with the UN General Assembly
resolutions on bottom trawling.184 While politically attractive because
no U.S. fisher stands to lose, this option might carry some legal risk
under WTO law because the U.S. allows bottom trawling within its
own EEZ, although it has taken some efforts to regulate this activity.
However, the U.S. could emphasize that its ban on bottom-trawled, or
a subset of bottom-trawled, fish from the high seas is intended to pro-
tect biodiversity on the high seas. The U.S. could also highlight that
unilateral action is necessary because of limited high seas governance
and inadequate implementation of the General Assembly resolutions.
The question remains whether a combination of a solid brief for
protecting the high seas, environmentalist advocacy for a ban, and si-
lence or tacit support from the large portion of the U.S. fishing indus-
try might be sufficient to induce the U.S. to be a first mover in ending
high seas fishing. However, a confluence of factors could lead the U.S.
to unilaterally ban the import of some, and maybe all, high seas
fish.185
V. CONCLUSION
The bold proposal to end fishing on the high seas is worth consider-
ing because of its potential for significant environmental benefit.
While the proposal remains a fringe idea at the moment, supported
perhaps only by a few conservationist-minded academics, it is possible
to imagine ways that it might be implemented. This Essay has sought
to emphasize the potential for unilateral steps to implement a ban by
a leading seafood importer such as the U.S. Given the risk of leakage,
a unilateral import ban is probably best regarded as a stepping stone
toward plurilateral or multilateral action, but someone always needs
to take the first step.
184. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 25, at 143 (arguing that the U.S. should impose
unilateral trade sanctions on countries that are not protecting deep sea areas on the
high seas from bottom trawling). I thank Matt Gianni for the idea for the more
targeted ban on a subset of bottom-trawled fish. GIANNI ET AL., supra note 34, at 3.
185. In contrast, it is harder to imagine a confluence of interests that would lead
Japan or the EU to be the first to ban high seas fishing and imports of fish caught on
the high seas. High seas fishing seems to be a more economically-important activity
for both the Japanese fleet, and for some fishing industries in EU-member states, than
for the U.S. fishing fleet. See Swartz et al., supra note 25, at 1,369; GIANNI ET AL.,
supra note 34, at 6.
